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ADDENDUM A

AE 02/03.37

Unlawful Conduct
A.

Any act or conduct that constitutes a wrongful
practice as defined by federal, State or local law
is prohibited.

B.

Such prohibited conduct includes, but is not
limited to:

C.

1.

the misuse or unauthorized possession and/or
use of State property or the property of any
person, including the theft, distribution,
destruction or damage of such property;

2.

the unauthorized use or distribution, including
the falsification, modification, or destruction,
of any State record or document;

3.

the unauthorized distribution or disclosure
of confidential, private or privileged
information;

4.

inducing or directing any member in the State
service or any other person to commit any act
which constitutes a wrongful practice, including
threatening, coercing or harassing any person
or the giving or receiving of money or any
other goods, services or considerations in
exchange for personal gain except where such
practices are lawfully provided; or

5.

the conviction of any criminal act.

If a member is under investigation for unlawful
conduct by any law enforcement agency, the
Department shall not be precluded from engaging
in an administrative investigation and/or
imposing disciplinary sanctions up to and
including discharge.

AE 02/03.00

STAFF CONDUCT REQUIREMENTS

AE 02/03.01

Standard of Conduct
A.

Members will respect and protect the civil and
legal rights of all offenders.

B.

Members shall be respectful, courteous and civil
with the public and each other and shall not use
coarse, loud, indecent, profane or unnecessarily
harsh language in any public place.

C.

All members shall perform their duties as required
or directed by law, Departmental rule, policy or
order, or by order of a superior officer. All
lawful duties required or directed by competent
authority shall be performed promptly as directed.

D.

Members are expected to apply themselves to their
assigned duties during the full schedule for which
they are being compensated.

E.

Members shall meet standards established in their
individual performance plan and report conditions
or circumstances that would prevent them from
performing their job effectively or completing
their assigned tasks. Members should bring to
their supervisors attention unclear instructions
or procedures.

F.

Members are expected to make prudent and frugal
use of State funds, equipment, buildings and supplies.

G.

Members shall observe work place rules.

H.

Members shall comply with general State and Department
administrative policies, rules and regulations.

I.

All members shall carry with them at all times on
duty their badge and/or identification card.

J.

The hours of all officers and civilian employees
of the Department shall be regulated by the executive
director who has the authority, when necessary, to
call any officer or civilian employee to return to
duty at any time, regardless of the hours assigned
to that officer or civilian employees.

K.

Members shall not engage in "horseplay" or the
playing of pranks while on duty at any time, nor
in the offices, training rooms, locker rooms, or
other rooms or buildings allotted to the use of
the Department.

Members shall not associate socially with, or
fraternize with, the spouse of any person in the
employment of the Department in a manner which
brings discredit to the Department or adversely
effects the efficiency and good order of the
Department•
Members shall not conduct their personal lives in
an immoral manner which brings discredit to the
Department or in any way adversely effects the
efficiency of the Department.
Members shall not, while on duty or in uniform,
engage in religious discussions or debates to the
detriment of good discipline, nor speak disparagingly
of the nationality, race or beliefs of any person.
No member .shall act or behave privately or officially
in such a manner that undermines the efficiency of
the Department, causes the public to lose confidence
in the Department, or brings discredit upon himself,
the State of Utah or the Department.
No member shall engage in any act or conduct which
violates Federal, State or local laws or ordinances.
No member shall become a member of any organization,
association, movement, group or combination which
.has adopted a policy of advocating violence or
"acts of force to deny others their constitutional
rights, or. .who* advocate racial or religious
discrimination as a political philosophy or objective.
No member shall ridicule, mock, deride, taunt, or
belittle any person or group of persons; nor
willfully embarrass, humiliate or shame any person;
nor do anything that might incite any person to
violence.
Because the public health, safety and welfare may
be adversely affected thereby, no member shall
have the right to engage in or encourage any form
of sit-down, slow-down, or in fact any form of
work stoppage or strike for any reason, against
the community. A refusal by a member to perform
an assignment which he reasonably believes to be
injurious to his'health or physical safety shall
not be considered a violation of this section.

AE 02/02.02

Member Responsibility
A. Members are responsible for reading the information
contained in this chapter and in the manual system
to ensure knowledge and an understanding of the
rules, regulations and standards of conduct to
which each is required to adhere, and by which
each is required to function.
B.

Members shall be subject to disciplinary and/or
other corrective action, including termination, if
it is found that they have participated in an act,
conspired to commit an act, served as an accessory
or accomplice in the commission of any act, or
failed to report any act which violates these
rules and regulations, other Department policies
and procedures or laws of the State of Utah or the
United States.

C.

Members shall report in writing to a superior
officer incidents or occurrences involving an
omission or violation of the rules, regulations
and requirements set forth in this chapter*

ADDENDUM B

State of Utah
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
EXECUTIVE OFFICES
Norman H.Bangerter
Governor
Gary W Deland
Executive Director

6100 South Fashion Bivd
Murray, Utah 84107
(801)265-5500

P*n

1391

^xsssss*

°OUNS£i

Department of Corrections
Report and Recommendation
89 GWD 39
Michael Dean Hummel
The parties appeared before this examiner on April 25, 1990
for an evidentiary hearing on charges filed in an Administrative
Complaint by the Department of Corrections on November 3, 1989.
Ms. Leslie Glenn represented the Department. Ms. Kathryn Collard
represented Mr. Hummel.
BACKGROUND
The Administrative Complaint alleges three counts of
misconduct by Mr. Hummel. The first alleges a violation of AE
02/03.37 A (5), Unlawful Conduct. The facts pled by the Department
in support of that charge, stated briefly, are three reports of
child abuse (August 1979, November 1988 and July of 1989). The
July allegation resulted in the filing of a criminal charge of
Child Abuse, 76-5-109, Utah Code Annotated (1953). The charge, per
the Administrative Complaint and the Third Circuit Court's Docket
Sheet, was a Class B misdemeanor. Mr. Hummel entered a guilty plea
to that charge.
The second charge alleges a violation of AE 02/02.02 C, Member
Responsibility. The facts pled in support of that charge state
that Mr. Hummel did not advise his supervisors of the matter until
the day he was sentenced to 30 days in the Salt Lake County jail by
Judge Griffiths on October 10, 1989. The commitment was issued
forthwith.
The third charge alleges a violation of AE 02/03.01 0,
Standard of Conduct. The facts pled in support of that charge deal
with Mr. Hummel's conduct at sentencing, which the Department
alleged brought discredit on the Department.
On June 22, 1990, Ms. Collard filed a motion to stay the
administrative proceedings, alleging the plea was defective and
should not be used as a basis for action until Mr. Hummel had the
opportunity to petition the courts to set aside his plea of guilty.
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This examiner granted the motion to stay the administrative
proceedings pending the outcome of Mr. Hummel's efforts to withdraw
his guilty plea. This examiner felt the stay was in the best
interest of the parties. Mr. Hummel unsuccessfully sought relief
in the Circuit Court before Judge Griffiths. Following hearings
before Judge Griffiths, Mr. Hummel appealed the matter to the Utah
Court of Appeals. In a Memorandum Decision filed November 14,
1990, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Mr. Hummel
then petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for a Writ of Certiorari.
His petition was denied on March 5, 1991. This examiner received
a copy of the denial on April 3, 1991. The time for issuing this
Report and Recommendation was extended for ten working days on May
1, 1991.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Mr. Hummel stands convicted, based on his guilty plea, of
Child Abuse, a Class B misdemeanor.
The charge was based on
information coming from the victim, her aunt and grandfather. The
victim had bruises on her back, arms and face. She told Detective
Leslee Collins of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office that her
father, Michael Hummel, had caused the injuries. She said her
father struck her as punishment for calling her mother at work.
She had called because her parents had locked the refrigerator and
her infant brother needed milk. Her mother told her where the key
was, she unlocked the refrigerator, gave milk to her brother,
returned it to the refrigerator and re-locked it. Later that
afternoon, Mr. Hummel was awakened by a telephone call from his
wife who told him what had happened. He then disciplined the
children, which resulted in the injuries to the victim.
When Mr. Hummel was interviewed by Detective Collins he
admitted striking the victim once on the face. He stated he had no
idea where the bruises on the other side of her face, her arms and
back had come from. He said the reason he struck the victim was he
heard an argument between the victim and her mother. When he
joined them he heard the victim call her mother a "fucking bitch"
and hit the victim very hard on the side of her head. Mr. Hummel
submitted a hand written statement that says he struck the victim
leaving a bruise on her face.
The victim testified' before this examiner.
Prior to her
testimony she was advised by Ms. Kim Rilling, an attorney referred
to this examiner by the Juvenile Court, of her rights and the
potential consequences of recanting. Ms. Rilling informed this
examiner that she had advised the victim of her rights and believed
the victim understood her rights and the potential consequences of
recanting. This examiner is most grateful to Ms. Rilling for her
help in this matter.
The victim, then 12 years old, was sworn and testified. She
recanted her allegations against her father and said she received
2
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the bruises at the hands of a male by the name of Mike present at
her Aunt Victoria Smith's home. She said she and a friend were
playing in the kitchen when their activities caused some white
powder Mike was doing something with to be knocked off the table.
Mike then struck her, causing the bruises.
The victim said she told several persons, including Detective
Collins, the marks were caused by her father. She said she accused
him because she was angry over the chores she was expected to do.
She first recanted while her father was in jail. Her mother told
her the day her father went to jail that this matter might result
in her father losing his job. Two weeks later, while her father
was incarcerated, she told her mother what "really happened." This
occurred in the family room. She said she did this because she did
not want her father to be in any more trouble. She said her father
slapped her once, leaving no mark.
The victim told Rick Cobia, a social worker assigned to the
case, that her injuries were not caused by her father. Mr. Cobia
testified regarding a home visit on November 5, 1989. The victim's
father instructed the victim to tell Mr. Cobia what she had
confessed to her father earlier. Mr. Hummel was present in the
family room when the victim stated her earlier explanation for her
bruises was a lie. She said her aunt, Tori Smith, had instructed
her to blame her father. When Mr. Cobia asked why she had blamed
her father she said she was angry with her father and felt people
would believe her as her father was already in trouble. This was
the third time the victim had been placed in protective custody.
One placement was made when the victim was 18 months old and one
occurred in November of 1988.
November 5, 1989, was Mr. Cobiafs first visit with the victim.
He did not ask to speak to her alone.
Sometime during the
interview Mrs. Hummel came in to the family room.
Mr. Cobia
testified the victim appeared fine and that there was no indication
of pressure.
Mr. Hummel presented evidence before this examiner similar to
that presented before Judge Griffiths. Copies of the tapes of the
proceedings before Judge Griffiths have been reviewed.
Judge
Griffiths found the recantation of the victim was not sufficiently
reliable to warrant a withdrawal of the plea. He also found the
motion was not timely. The appellate process, focusing on the
timeliness issue, upheld Judge Griffiths' refusal to allow Mr.
Hummel to withdraw the plea. The appellate process did not address
whether there was a factual basis for the plea.
This examiner is not persuaded by the victim's recantation
that her first account of how she was injured is untrue. The
defense presented the victim's testimony and the testimony of her
parents. No testimony was offered from other persons who would
know what occurred at the home of the victim's aunt. This examiner

3
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is concerned that apparently none of the agencies investigating
this matter sought information from Ms. Smith or Mike. However,
the person with the greatest motive to elicit that information was
Mr. Hummel. He did not do so in either forum where the recantation
was an issue.
At the time of the abuse, the victim had significant
responsibility for her younger siblings. Her mother told her Mr.
Hummel probably would lose his job because of the accusation she
had made. This occurred on the day Mr. Hummel went to jail. Her
first recantation was made to her mother while her father was in
jail. She said she did this because she did not want her father to
get in any more trouble when he came home. She also testified she
thought her father might have to go back to jail after the hearing
in the instant case was over. She told Mr. Cobia she had lied
after her father, then released from jail and back in the home,
instructed her to tell Mr. Cobia what she had earlier told her
parents. Her father was present during that recantation. Her
mother joined the group in the family room while the victim spoke
to Mr. Cobia. The victim testified her brothers had expressed
their displeasure with her for getting Mr. Hummel in trouble.
The presentence report states both parents expressed a desire
to have the victim removed from the home if Mr. Hummel lost his job
because of the victim's accusation. However, the victim testified
this had not been discussed with her. During an interview with
Detective Collins, the victim stated her father had told her the
November 1988 incident would prevent him from becoming a deputy
sheriff.
Based on the information available, and reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom, this examiner finds the victim's recantation
unreliable.
Mr. Hummel testified he did not report his involvement in the
criminal justice system to his supervisors. He testified he was
not familiar with AE 02/02.02 C, which requires a written report of
matters such as the charges brought against him, at the time of his
conversation with Agent Gwen Rowley. He said there was no need to
report it, as he understood Detective Collins had already contacted
his supervisor. Mr. Hummel had a copy of Policy and Procedure. He
said no one had explained AE 02/02.02 C to him.
After his
discussion with Agent Rowley he thought about reporting it, but
decided not to because of embarrassment and the knowledge the
Sheriff's Office had already contacted the Department.
Mr. Will Fowlke and Mr. Steve Mclff
not reported to them by Mr. Hummel. Both
of command.
Mr. Hummel did instruct
Department he would be unable to report
ordered him to spend 30 days in the
forthwith.

testified the matter was
are in Mr. Hummel's chain
his wife to inform the
for work when the judge
Salt Lake County Jail,

4
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Agent Rowley, who prepared the presentence report on Mr.
Hummel for the court, testified she had informed Mr. Hummel of the
requirement in Policy and Procedure for him to report this matter.
She asked if Mr. Hummel had reported the matter. He said he had
not. She informed him policy required he do so and began to reach
for the policy. Mr. Hummel stopped her. He told her he would not
report it, that it was not his supervisors' business and that he
did not care about policy and procedure. This examiner finds her
testimony credible.
Mr. Hummel had knowledge of his duty to report the charges
brought against him and failed to provide a written report to his
superiors. At a minimum, he had notice through his copy of Policy
and Procedure.
There is no question he had notice after his
conversation with Agent Rowley.
Mr. Hummel appeared before Judge Griffiths on October 10,
1989, for sentencing. Mr. Hummel believed his plea would be held
in abeyance, though the judge had told him earlier he was not bound
by an agreement between the parties to hold the plea. Mr. Hummel's
mother had died of a heart attack in July. That event was followed
closely by an investigation leading to criminal charge and his
presence before the court. He was under stress because of the
circumstances.
Judge Griffiths, possessing the presentence report, took Mr.
Hummel to task for his conduct.
He made comments about Mr.
Hummel's father, characterizing him as a bully.
During the
discussion of Mr. Hummel's background and the circumstances giving
rise to the charges, Mr. Hummel interjected that he was the master
of his house, and later the runner of his house. There was also a
point when the judge said he did not think Mr. Hummel should be an
officer because he had all the makings of being abusive and cruel.
The tape then reflects the following:
The Court:

I don't think the Department of Corrections needs
any officers like you. They have enough trouble
already.

Mr. Hummel:

I appreciate your confidence, sir.

The Court:

No, I don't have any confidence in you. I don't
want you to get that. . . . and you can be sarcastic
with me if you like, but then if you don't want to
change • • •

This examiner finds Mr. Hummel was argumentative and sarcastic
with Judge Griffiths at his sentencing. The judge identified Mr.
Hummel in open court as a Corrections Officer. His conduct before
the court brought discredit upon the Department and upon law
enforcement.

5
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Mr. Hummel's guilty plea constitutes a conviction.
The
propriety of that conviction has been litigated in the courts. It
may not be re-litigated in this forum. The conviction establishes
a violation of AE 02/03.37 A (5), Unlawful Conduct. Mr. Hummel's
statement to Detective Collins that he slapped the victim hard
enough to leave a bruise, in this examiner's view, establishes a
violation of 76-5-109, U.C.A. The reference made by the Department
to alleged abuse in August of 1979 and November 1988 do nothing to
establish the charge as filed by the Department.
Neither
allegation resulted in a conviction.
Mr. Hummel's willful failure to report the charges and his
plea constitute
a violation of AE
02/02.02 C, Member
Responsibility. Mr. Hummel is required to know what is contained
in Policy and Procedure. He signed documents acknowledging this
responsibility. While it may be argued that Mr. Hummel did not
know he had a duty under AE 02/02.02 C to report the filing of
charges, his appearance in open court to enter a guilty plea to
child abuse make it clear this is something he should have
reported. Such an event is an occurrence that would cause the
public to lose faith, confidence and trust in the Department.
There is no question he knew of his duty to report the matter after
his conversation with Agent Rowley.
Mr. Hummel's conduct in open court constitutes a violation of
AE 02/03.01, Standard of Conduct. Mr. Hummel, identified in open
court as a corrections officer, was disrespectful to the court.
This examiner notes with concern Mr. Hummel's written response
to this allegation, found on pages 5 and 6 of his answer. It reads
as follows:
"Mr. Hummel denies this charge and affirmatively
alleges that his remarks at the hearing before Judge
Griffith (sic) are taken wholly out of context and that
a review of the entire record would demonstrate that his
remarks were not in any way improper."
"Mr. Hummel felt that despite the fact that he
denied ever abusing his daughter or any of his children,
Judge Griffith (sic), for reasons unknown to Mr. Hummel,
did not believe Mr. Hummel, which was very humiliating
and upsetting to Mr. Hummel."
"Prior to appearing before Judge Griffith (sic), Mr.
Hummel had been led to believe that he would be diverted
and the charges dismissed. When this did not occur, Mr.
Hummel became confused and emotionally distraught."
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"It was not Mr. Hummel's intention to discredit the
Department by any of his actions or statements to Judge
Griffith (sic). The experience of having false charges
of abusing his children brought against him has been
personally humiliating and distressing, and Mr. Hummel's
reluctance to discuss these unfounded charges publicly
was due to his embarrassment at being the subject of such
charges."
This examiner has listened to the entire record pertaining to
the entry of Mr. Hummel's plea at arraignment and to his
sentencing.
The review demonstrates that his remarks were
improper. For him to advance the argument that a review of the
entire record would show his remarks "were not in any way improper"
raises a question about his judgment and understanding of the
circumstances. Certainly Mr. Hummel was under stress at the time
of sentencing. Nevertheless, he demonstrated poor judgement by his
responses to Judge Griffiths.
His comment that he was master of his house indicates an
unwillingness to cooperate with the court when it came to matters
within the four walls of his home. This is supported by the fact
that Mr. Hummel refused to sign a waiver that would allow Agent
Rowley access to information from Dr. Eric Nielsen, who evaluated
Mr. Hummel prior to sentencing.
His comment that he appreciated Judge Griffiths' confidence
when the Judge said he did not believe Mr. Hummel should be an
officer is obviously sarcastic and patently disrespectful. It
could only strengthen Judge Griffiths' opinion of Mr. Hummel's
fitness to serve as an officer. His remarks establish a violation
of AE 02/03.01, Standard of Conduct.
RECOMMENDATION
Mr. Hummel is a certified peace officer. He is held to a
higher standard under policy and by the public. The standard was
well stated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
Mr. Hummel's
conduct falls short of that standard, quoted below.
"Twentieth Century America has the right to demand
for itself, and the obligation to secure for its
citizens, law enforcement personnel whose conduct is
above and beyond reproach.
The police officer is
expected to conduct himself lawfully and properly to
bring honor and respect to the law which he is sworn and
duty-bound to uphold. He who fails to so comport brings
upon the law grave shadows of public distrust. We demand
from our law enforcement officers, and properly so,
adherence to demanding standards which are higher than
those applied to many other professions.
It is a
standard which demands more than forbearance from overt
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and indictable illegal conduct. It demands that in both
and officer's private and official lives he do nothing to
bring dishonor upon his noble calling and in no way
contribute to a weakening of the public confidence and
trust of which he is a repository."
Cerceo v. Darby, 3 Pa.Cmwlth. 174f 183; 281 A.2d 251, 255 (1977).
The most serious matter in this case is the conviction for
child abuse. In .Dexter v. Idaho Falls City Police Department, 742
P.2d 434, 113 Idaho 179 (1987), the Idaho Court of Appeals reviewed
the termination of a police officer who was terminated for the off
duty physical abuse of his stepchildren.
Following an
investigation, the Chief of Police concluded the off-duty conduct
was an act "tending to injure the public service" and discharged
Dexter. A hearing was held before the Idaho Falls Civil Service
Commission.
The Commission affirmed the termination.
The
Commission found Dexter's actions as a parent adversely reflected
on his calling as an officer and cast serious doubt on his
abilities to function as a police officer. This determination was
upheld by the District Court.
On appeal, Dexter argued the findings of the Commission were
not supported by substantial evidence and were not sufficient to
support the conclusion that Dexter's conduct tended to injure the
public service. For almost four years he had performed his duties
in a satisfactory manner. Evidence was presented by Dexter that he
was able to control his temper in stressful situations not
involving his stepchildren. Nevertheless,
"The Commission concluded that Dexter's demonstrated
inability to control his temper when confronted with
relatively insignificant provocation cast significant
doubt on his ability to perform his job duties;"
Dexter, supra at 435, 180.
The Court held the Commission's findings were reasonable and
supported by substantial and competent evidence. They also refused
to address the issue of privacy, as it was raised for the first
time on appeal.
The concurrence did address the privacy issue.
It noted
"tending to injure the public service" was a broad standard with
the potential for infringing on the right to privacy. It then
stated,
"In this case, the employee has argued that his
conduct—injuring two young children in his home—was
within the scope of a right to privacy and did not
significantly impact upon the public interest in
maintaining the integrity of law enforcement. I disagree
8
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with the employee's basic premise. Substantial physical
injury to children is not protected by any privacy
interest. But even if it were, I would not disturb the
Civil Service Commission's implicit determination that
the public interest in the integrity of law enforcement
should be given prevailing weight in this case."
Id., at 437, 182.
This examiner agrees with the concurrence. There is no right
of privacy that prevents the criminal justice system or the
Department of Corrections from taking action because the conduct
occurred in a home. Child abuse is not protected by a privacy
interest. The Department and its employees must act in a manner
worthy of public trust and assuring the integrity of law
enforcement. Mr. Hummel's conviction is inimical to the legitimate
interests of the public and the Department.
Mr. Hummel's conviction is a matter of public record. It is
possible his conviction is known, or will become known, to
offenders. Mr. Fowlke testified Mr. Hummel's situation may affect
his ability to deal with offenders. He also testified staff had
lost confidence in Mr. Hummel, that there was a concern about his
carrying a firearm and that he was assigned to one of the towers,
where he did not have a firearm.
This examiner agrees with the Dexter court that abusing a
child is indicative of an inability to control one's actions on the
job, and has a concern about Mr. Hummel's ability to exercise good
judgment and restraint when under stress. This concern exists,
notwithstanding the lack of any evidence Mr. Hummel has been unable
to control his actions on the job, and is not based on the
conviction alone.
Mr. Hummel did not exercise good judgment before Judge
Griffiths. It is not wise to antagonize one with the authority to
immediately incarcerate you. Mr. Hummel did. His conduct may have
played a role in the judge's decision to sentence him to 30 days in
the Salt Lake County Jail, forthwith. Furthermore, Mr. Hummel
asserted his conduct was not improper. It is one thing, in the
heat of the moment, to exercise poor judgement.
It is quite
another, when the stress of the moment has passed, to be unable to
recognize the exercise of poor judgement.
Mr. Hummel did not exercise good judgment during the process
of preparing the presentence report. If not before, he certainly
knew after his interview with Agent Rowley that he had a duty to
inform his supervisors. He did not do so. He stated to Judge
Griffiths that 30 days in jail would cost him his job. If his job
were a concern, it seems Mr. Hummel would want to follow Policy and
Procedure and report the matter to his supervisors.
Whatever
degree of concern he had, it did not motivate him to comply. Agent

9
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Rowley testified Mr. Hummel expressly refused to report the matter,
stating it was not his supervisors' business and that he did not
care about Policy and Procedure.
This is in contrast to the
comments in one of Mr. Hummel's evaluations, quoted below. The
question whether one should be required to report such matters is
different from whether one is required to do so. Mr. Hummel
apparently substituted what he believes the rule ought to be for
what the rule is.
The delay in completing the administrative process is also an
issue. The delay was granted at the request of Mr. Hummel. He
should not be allowed to profit from the delay. His conduct during
the pendency of this matter should not play a significant role in
setting the sanction. The sanction should be based on Mr. Hummel's
conduct, with an eye to maintaining the integrity of the
Department.
A similar issue was decided in City of Minneapolis v. Moe, 450
N.W.2d 367 (Minn.App. 1990). Moe, an exemplary officer pled guilty
to felony possession of cocaine and was placed on probation for
three years.
He was fired by his department.
During the
administrative process reviewing his termination, Moe's conviction
was expunged. The court nevertheless upheld Moe's termination,
finding his efforts to rehabilitate himself were irrelevant to the
issue of good cause for discharge. The court stated the issue was
the integrity of the police department.
A review of Mr. Hummel's personnel file shows standard
evaluations since his employment with the Department began in 1987.
The evaluation for the period of July 1989 to July 1990 rated him
standard in all but two categories. These were not completed due
to the pendency of this action. His performance appraisal for the
period from December of 1987 through November of 1988, his
probationary period, contains the following:
"C.

Employee development:"

"Officer Hummel needs to be more involved with the
Department of Corrections concepts. Officer Hummel needs
to be more supportive of the decisions made by the
administrators of the Department.
Intra-personnel
relations classes may be of benefit to Mike as an
individual.
Officer Hummel needs to complete the
Correctional Officer Certification Training within the
next year."
,!

E. Overall Performance Level (justify rating) Comments:"

"Officer Hummel has shown a great deal of interest
in the development of Policy and Procedure for the
Department. His work on the D.M.C. policy is an example
of excellent work. Officer Hummel is very concerned
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about the operations and the direction of the Department
of Corrections. Continued positive actions within the
Bureau would be beneficial to both Mike as well as to the
Department." (Emphasis added)
Mr. Hummel's supervisor made comments as part of Mr. Hummel's
evaluation period for July of 1988 through June of 1989.
"Examples of work well done"
"Developed and implemented new restraints for the U.M.C.
operation giving better security of the Inmate population
at U.M.C. Assisted Lt. Bartell in writing a training
course for the tKM.C. nursing staff so they better
understood our policies and concerns."
"Areas needing improvement"
"Mr. Hummel needs to develop better communications with
his immediate supervisors."
"Mr. Hummel and I have talked at lenght (sic) about this
and I feel it will be corrected during the next
evaluation year." (Emphasis added)
It appears that twice Mr. Hummel's interest in Policy and
Procedure was noted as a positive asset.
It is ironic that a
supervisor stated a need to improve communications with supervisors
would be corrected during the next year, with Mr. Hummel's
signature appearing above the comments, only to have Mr. Hummel
refuse to make a required communication to his supervisors.
Based on the foregoing, this examiner recommends, as a
maximum, that Mr. Hummel be terminated. The minimum recommended
sanction is 30 days off without pay, reduction in grade, and
placement in a position where no weapon is required and contact
with offenders is minimal. Should Mr. Hummel be retained, this
examiner recommends fitness for duty testing with a complete report
of all relevant information on past and present conduct and
problems.

/otU

DATED this J_U±Kot

May, 1991.

R. Spencer Robinson
Administrative Law Judge
Utah Department of Corrections
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ADDENDUM C

State of Utah
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
EXECUTIVE OFFICES
Norman H. Bangerter
Governor
Gary W. DeLand
Exacuiiv* Director

6100 South Fashion Blvd.
Murray, Utah 84107
(801)265-5500

iS£L
Department of Corrections
Final Order
v.
89 GWD 39
Michael Dean Hummel
Background
On May 10, 1991, Administrative Law Judge R. Spencer
ROBINSON entered a Report and Recommendation as a result of
disciplinary charges arising from Mr. HUMMEL'S arrest on charges
of child abuse. Judge ROBINSON, after thorough review of the
circumstances and Mr. HUMMEL'S work record, recommended a
sanction of no less than 30 days off without pay, reduction in
grade, placement in a post where no weapon is required, and
contact with offenders is minimal. The maximum recommended by
Judge ROBINSON was termination.
On May 13, 1991, 0. Lane MCCOTTER sent a memorandum
containing his recommendation to Executive Director Gary W.
DELAND. Director MCCOTTER, after reviewing the Report and
Recommendation and discussing the matter with Bureau Chief Will
FOWLKE, recommended termination.
Mr. HUMMEL was given notice of Director MCCOTTER'S
recommendation in a letter dated May 14, 1991. He was also
placed on leave with pay pending the outcome of the matter. Mr.
HUMMEL requested an appeal hearing. One was scheduled with
Deputy Director N. Bruce EGAN for May 23, 1991 at 10:00 a.m.
Deputy Director EGAN was unavoidably detained and requested
that I meet with Mr. HUMMEL. Following a review of the Report
and Recommendation and a discussion with Judge ROBINSON of the
appeals process, I met with Mr. HUMMEL from approximately 10:10
to 11:15.
Discussion
Mr. HUMMEL addressed all three areas subject to review on
appeal. He did not challenge the due process afforded him by the
Department, though he felt the courts had not afforded him due
process in his efforts to withdraw his plea of guilty to the
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charge of child abuse, a Class B misdemeanor. He understood the
administrative process is unable to review the decisions of
courts.
Mr. HUMMEL acknowledged, based on his unsuccessful efforts
to withdraw his plea, which went to the Utah Supreme Court, that
he stands convicted of the offense of child abuse. He also
acknowledged he had not reported the circumstances as required by
policy.
He maintained he was not, in fact, guilty of child abuse and
that his daughter had lied when she initially reported him. He
argued there was not substantial evidence to support the finding
his daughter's recantation was unreliable. He also said a review
of the entire record of his appearance before Judge GRIFFITHS for
sentencing would show a lack of substantial evidence he was
argumentative and sarcastic with Judge GRIFFITHS. He maintained
the remarks contained in the Administrative Complaint were taken
out of context.
Mr. HUMMEL argued the sanction of termination is excessive.
This argument is based, at least in part, on his argument that he
did not abuse his daughter and that he did not show disrespect
for the court at sentencing.
Based on my discussion with Mr. HUMMEL and my review of the
Report and Recommendation, I find the Department has granted Mr.
HUMMEL due process.
There is substantial evidence he stands convicted of child
abuse and that he did not report his involvement in the criminal
justice system as required. There is substantial evidence to
support the finding his daughter's recantation is unreliable.
There is substantial evidence to support the finding Mr. HUMMEL
acted inappropriately before Judge GRIFFITHS.
Mr. HUMMEL'S status as a peace officer is an aggravating
circumstance. It must be a factor in weighing the
appropriateness of the recommended sanctions. In light of the
evidence, I find termination is the appropriate sanction.
Decision
Based on the foregoing, it is my Order that Mr. HUMMEL'S
employment with Utah Department of Corrections be terminated.
This Final Order is entered this 2 % ^ day of May, 1991•

.TV .\\>V-.- o
David Franchina
Deputy Director
Utah Department of Corrections
d

ADDENDUM D

BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH
-00O00--

In The Matter Of:
FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND FINAL DECISION
OF HEARING OFFICER

MICHAEL DEAN HUMMEL,
Grievant,
v.

Case No.
11 CSRB/H.O. 151

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
Agency.
—00O00--

In compliance with Utah Code Annotated, §67-19a-406, an adjudicative proceeding under
the auspices of the Career Service Review Board's (WCSRBM) Step 5 procedures was held in this
matter. A certified court reporter made a verbatim record of the proceedings; testimony and
documentary evidence were received into the record. Witnesses were placed under oath.
The matter came before A. Robert Thorup, the appointed CSRB Hearing Officer on
August 11, October 29, November 13, 1992, and on February 1-3, and April 12, 1993.
Grievant was represented by Kathryn Collard of the law firm of COLLARD & RUSSET J,, and
the Agency was represented by Ralph Adams, Asst. Attorney General.
Both sides submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and both sides
filed briefs concerning the law of child abuse applicable to this case. In addition, both sides
provided legal authorities to the Hearing Officer after the conclusion of the hearing on the issue
of burden of proof in connection with allegations of criminal wrongdoing.
Having heard the testimony and reviewed the documentary evidence received from the
parties in relation to this matter, and being otherwise fully advised, the Hearing Officer
(Presiding Officer, Utah Code Annotated, §63-46b-2(l)(h)) now makes and enters the following
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision.
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1. Grievant was charged with a violation of Section 76-5-lG9(3)(a), Utah Code
Annotated (as then in effect), a Class A misdemeanor commonly called "child abuse". On
August 14, 1989, Grievant entered a plea of guilty to the criminal charge, believing that by
doing so he would obtain a dismissal of the charge pursuant to a plea bargain.
2. On October 10,1989, Judge Griffiths sentenced Grievant to pay a fine of $300 (Three
hundred dollars), perform 150 hours of community service and serve (30) thirty days in jail.
Grievant was committed to jail forthwith.
3. Grievant was released from the Salt Lake County Jail on or about November 5,1989.

4. The Department illegally suspended Grievant from his position without pay, and
Grievant remained suspended without pay from October 10, 1989, until February 21, 1990,
when he was reinstated with back pay, after the Grievant's legal counsel advised the Agency that
it was illegal for the Agency to suspend Grievant without pay prior to notice and hearing.
5. When he was reinstated by the Agency, Grievant was assigned to an outlying and
abandoned tower where he was alone except for the company of the rats and other animals who
had become used to occupying the abandoned tower. Grievant cleaned up the abandoned tower
and was diligently serving in this assignment when he was served on November 20, 1989 with
the Agency's Administrative Complaint which began the disciplinary process against the
Grievant.
6. The Agency charged Grievant with three violations of its Code of Policy And
Procedure, namely:
(1)
His conviction on the charge of child abuse, a class B
misdemeanor, was an alleged violation of AE 02/03.37A(5), "Unlawful conductM;
(2)
His alleged failure to report the criminal charge against him in
writing to his supervisor, Will Fowlke, on the day the criminal charge was made,
was an alleged violation of AE 02/02.02 C, "Member Responsibility";
and
(3)
Making remarks to the Judge at the time of sentencing on the
criminal charge, was alleged to have brought discredit to the Department, and
was an alleged violation of AE 02.03.01, "Standard of Conduct."
7. The Agency charged that Grievant's alleged misconduct was aggravated by his alleged
statement to Pretrial Services worker, Gwen Rowley, "I won't tell my supervisor. It's none of
his business. I don't care about the Policies and Procedures," and that Grievant allegedly used
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his state issue gun belt and clips to discipline his children. Grievant subsequently denied these
allegations.
8. During the time Grievant was in jail, Grievant's daughter, Sabrina, told Mrs.
Hummel that she had falsely accused her father of causing the bruises that led to him being
charged with criminal child abuse,
9. After Grievant was released from jail on or about November 1, 1989, Sabrina told
Grievant how she had received the bruising of which she had falsely accused him of inflicting.
10. On November 5, 1989, at the request of Grievant's legal counsel, Mr. Rick Cobia
of the Division of Family Services, visited with Grievant's family. Sabrina told Mr. Cobia that
she had falsely accused her father of causing bruises. Mr. Cobia testified that Sabrina appeared
fine and that there was no indication that she had been pressured to recant her charges against
the Grievant.
11. On March 30, 1990, Grievant filed a motion in the Circuit Court to set aside his
guilty plea and have his conviction reversed because the plea was illegally taken. The Circuit
Court denied this motion, and a subsequent motion for reconsideration based on new evidence,
filed on May 3, 1990, and Grievant appealed these rulings to the Utah Court of Appeals.
12. In the interval between these two motions, in April 25, 1990, Grievant appeared
before the Agency's Administrative Law Judge, R. Spencer Robinson, for a hearing on the
Agency's administrative complaint against Grievant.
13. During the hearing, Sabrina again, under oath, testified that she had falsely accused
her father and that she had been injured by a male in her aunt's home.
14. On June 22, 1990, the Administrative Law Judge continued the administrative
hearing on Grievant's motion to permit him to pursue his appeal of the Circuit Court's
judgments denying his motion to withdraw his plea and set aside his conviction.
15. On November 14, 1990, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial Court and Grievant
filed a Petition For Certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court, which was denied on March 5, 1991.
The dissenting opinion indicated that Grievant's plea had clearly been taken in violation of Utah
law, and that Grievant might obtain relief through the filing of a habeas corpus, which Grievant
subsequently filed on June 27, 1991.
16. In the interim, on May 10, 1991, the Agency's Administrative Law Judge issued a
Report and Recommendation finding against Grievant on all material issues of fact and law. The
Report and Recommendation concluded with a recommendation for "a minimum of 30 days off
without pay, reduction in grade, and placement in a position where no weapon is required and
contact with offenders is minimal, to a maximum of termination."

-3-

17. On May 17, 1991, Grievant filed an appeal to the Executive Director of the Agency
from the Report and Recommendation of the Agency's Administrative Law Judge,
18. On May 28, 1991, the Agency issued a Final Order denying Grievant's appeal and
terminating Grievant's employment with the Agency, as opposed to some other level of
discipline, based upon Grievant's criminal conviction for "child abuse," a Class B Misdemeanor.
19. On June 4,1991, Grievant timely appealed to the Career Service Review Board from
the Final Order of the Agency terminating his employment. A Prehearing Conference was held
on July 2, 1991. Grievant submitted a Prehearing Conference Brief, contending that the Agency
had dismissed Grievant without just cause and that the discipline of termination was unjustified,
arbitrary, disproportionate and discriminatory.
20. The Agency did not file any response to Grievant's Prehearing Conference Brief.
21. On October 24, 1991, the Administrator of the CSRB granted Grievant's motion for
an indefinite stay of proceedings to permit Grievant to pursue an application for Writ of Habeas
Corpus to overturn his conviction based upon an illegally taken guilty plea.
22. In December 1991, the Agency stipulated that the Third Judicial District Court
should issue the Writ of Habeas Coipus sought by Grievant.
23. On January 2, 1992, the Third Judicial District Court granted Grievant's Writ of
Habeas Corpus, after making Findings of Fact and Conclusions Of Law which resulted in
Grievant's guilty plea being set aside, his conviction reversed, and the criminal charge dismissed
and ultimately expunged.
24. On June 3, 1992, pursuant to Grievant's motion, the Administrator lifted the
indefinite stay, and arranged for a hearing at Step 5.
25. On June 5, 1992, a Prehearing Conference before the Administrator was scheduled
to be held on June 24, 1992.
26. On June 16, 1992, the Agency filed a Motion For Order Remanding Action for
Agency Determination, which was denied by Order of the Administrator on June 26, 1992.
27. On July 2, 1992, the Agency filed a Motion For Reconsideration of the
Administrator's Order denying remand of the action, which Motion was denied by Order of the
undersigned Hearing Officer, on July 17, 1992.
28. On July 23, 1992, the Step 5 hearing was scheduled to commence on August 11,
1992.
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29. Between July 23, 1992, and August 11, 1992, the Agency's counsel, Ralph Adams,
in a telephone call regarding the scheduling of the Step 5 hearing in this matter, made a false
and defamatory comment to the Administrator,reportedby the Administrator in his letter to Mr.
Adams, dated August 11, 1992, wherein Mr. Adams asked the Administrator why he was
interested in setting a hearing date for Mr. Hummel, inasmuch as the Agency believed that
Grievant had committed child sex abuse.
30. On July 30, 1992, the Agency moved for a continuance of the Step 5 hearing, on
the ground that the Agency had been denied the right to proceed with discovery, although the
Agency had conducted no discovery during the prior year while the case was pending.
31. On August 4, 1992, the Agency sent its First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for
Production of Documents.
32. On August 11, 1992, the first session of the Step 5 hearing commenced before the
undersigned Hearing Officer. The Agency orally moved to recuse the Hearing Officer based
upon his denial of the Agency's motion to continue the hearing and for his alleged bias against
the Agency as allegedly reflected in the Hearing Officer's decision in the Parker matter, an
unrelated proceeding. The Hearing Officer denied the motion, but continued the Step 5 hearing
pending the Agency's appeal to the Board from the Hearing Officer's denial of the Agency's
Motion To Recuse.
33. The Career Service Review Board declined to recuse or reverse the Hearing Officer,
and the Step 5 hearing proceeded.
34. Grievant called as witnesses his spouse, Neila Hummel; his minor daughter, Sabrina;
Eric Nielsen, a contract social worker for the Agency; Det. Sgt. Allan Sawaya, Salt Lake
County; Floyd Armstrong, a former Agency employee, and Grievant testified on behalf of
himself.
34. The Agency called as witnesses Salt Lake County Detective Leslie Collins; Bruce
Foster, Grievant's father-in-law; Betty Foster, Grievant's mother-in-law; Victoria ("Tori")
Chacon Smith, Mrs. Hummel's sister; Drew McDonald; Tori's minor daughter, Gwen Rowley;
Richard Cobia; and William Fowlke, Grievant's supervisor.
35. All exhibits offered by both parties, except
Grievant's Exhibit 7, were received into evidence. Agency Exhibits 23 and 24 were received
over objection of the Grievant.
36. On the motion of the Grievant, the Hearing Officer ordered the Agency to produce
a summary of disciplinary actions and dispositions going back to 1986, to assist the Hearing
Officer in determining Grievant's claim that the discipline inflicted on Grievant was aibitrary,
disproportionate and discriminatory. The Agency produced the reported cases in question which
are summarized in Grievant's Exhibit 13, which was admitted.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
-The Agency's Allegations of Unlawful Conduct.
1. Grievant was hired by the Agency on or about December 27, 1987.
2. Grievant was at all pertinent times a certified peace officer, and had attained the rank
of Grade 21, Correctional Officer at the time of the termination of his employment by the
Agency.
3. For the entire time of his employment with the Agency, Grievant received satisfactory
evaluations from his superiors regarding the performance of his duties. There was never any
allegation that Grievant used excessive force or other irresponsible conduct in connection with
his duties at the Agency.
4. Grievant and his spouse both came from homes that under today's analysis would
probably be deemed dysfunctional. Grievant was raised under a fairly strict corporal punishment
regime, and he believed that this type of disciplinary regime was appropriate and necessary for
his own children based on his own experience as a child. Mrs. Hummel was raised under
conditions including divorce, corporal punishment and other problems that prompted her to leave
her family home at an early age. Neither of the families that produced Grievant and his spouse
had experienced the broadening influences that come with higher education and cultural
awareness. It was with this level of familial and cultural programming that Grievant and his
spouse entered upon the creation and management of their own family of four children.
5. There was a mismatch between Grievant's corporal punishment regime with relatively
strict discipline and Mrs. Hummel, who was overly permissive, although on occasion Mrs.
Hummel resorted to corporal punishment, including the use of weapons like a belt, when she
could take no more of the misconduct or verbal abuse from her children.
6. In 1988, the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Department interviewed Grievant and his
spouse in connection with allegations made by the Grievant's minor daughter, Sabrina and the
minor son, Rick to their school teachers.
7. The Sheriffs records indicate that both Sabrina and Rick had told their school
authorities that Grievant hit them frequently and that Mr. Hummel had struck both Sabrina and
Rick just prior to the time of reporting. Their was no indication of bruising or other injury at
this time. The children were taken into protective custody pending an investigation.
8. Just prior to these 1988 allegations by Sabrina and Rick, Sabrina had become angry
at her parents in connection with the arrangements for her school picture that had not been made
satisfactorily to Sabrina. Sabrina testified at the Step 5 hearing that he had made up the 1988
allegations in order to get back at her parents. Rick did not testify at the hearing.
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9. At the time of the 1988 situation, Grievant agreed to attend family counseling sessions
in return for an agreement from the Salt Lake County Prosecutor's Office that they would not
prosecute Grievant based on his children's allegations.
10. Grievant and his family did attend the counseling sessions, although they found the
teaching more suited to dealing with small children than with blooming adolescents like Sabrina
and Rick.
11. In 1989, Grievant and his family were living under very stressful circumstances.
Since 1987, Grievant's seriously ill and bedridden Mother had resided in the home with the
Grievant and his wife and four children. Therelationshipbetween Sabrina and her parents was
not good and there was a lack of mutual respect and trust.
12. Because of the financial demands of raising four children and caring for a sick
Mother, and because neither Grievant nor his spouse had the skills or education to get high
paying jobs, Grievant and Mrs. Hummel both worked full time and overtime.
13. Grievant and Mrs. Hummel also worked different shifts so that one of them could
be home at all times to feed and care for Grievant1 s Mother. As the result of this situation, the
entire family was basically confined to their home other than for work or school, without
occasional outings or vacations to relieve their collective stress.
14. Sabrina and, apparently Rick, were resentful of their parents' attitudes on discipline
and mismatching disciplinary styles, as well as of the responsibilities imposed on them, and
occasionally acted outrageously in order to get the attention they needed.
15. Sabrina was required to assume extra responsibilities and fend for herself and the
other children at times because of the work schedules of the parents.
16. On July 11, 1989, Sabrina was again tending the younger children.
17. Rick, had telephoned Mrs. Hummel at her place of employment several times on that
morning.
18. Grievant's infant son began crying and Sabrina believed the child was hungry and
in need of food.
19. Mrs. Hummel had put a chain around therefrigeratorso that the children could not
retrieve food from therefrigeratoroutside of mealtimes. Mrs. Hummel had arranged for certain
foods to be likely needed by the infant to be outside of the locked refrigerator.
20. Sabrina was sufficiently unaware of the food that was set aside for the infant that
she believed when the infant son was hungry that the only appropriate food was in the
refrigerator. Sabrina telephoned Mrs. Hummel at her place of employment to ask her where the
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key was to the lock on therefrigeratorso that she could retrieve food for the infant son. After
the call to Mrs. Hummel, Sabrina retrieved the food for the infant son and then locked the
refrigerator again.
21. Sometime later that morning, Grievant, arrived home from woric and went to bed.
Still later that morning, Mrs. Hummel called Grievant to inform him that the children had
telephoned her at work causing her job to be in jeopardy based on previous warnings of no
personal phone calls.
22. Grievant then confronted the children, specifically Sabrina, and following a heated
argument which probably involved physical assault by Sabrina, struck Sabrina about the head
and shoulders. Sabrina attempted to block the blows with her arms and, thus, received some
mild bruising on her head, back and arms.
23. The following Friday, July 14,1989, Mrs. Hummel took Sabrina to the home of her
sister, Victoria (Tori) Chacon Smith McDonald, for babysitting. There was a mildly
antagonistic relationship at that time between Grievant and Tori.
24. Present in Ms. McDonald's home on July 14, 1989, were Tori, Tori's daughter
Sheree, Mr. Drew McDonald, Sabrina Hummel and Rick Hummel.
25. Mr. McDonald and Sabrina had not met previous to that day.
26. Upon greeting Sabrina that morning, her Aunt Tori noticed bruises on Sabrina's
face. When Tori first asked Sabrina about the bruises, Sabrina asserted that it was the family
cat. Upon further questioning, Sabrina told Tori the bruises were caused by Grievant, as a
result of the episode involving the locked refrigerator and telephone calls to Mrs. Hummers
employment.
27. Later that morning, Tori took Sabrina to the home of Bnice Foster, who is Sabrina's
step-grandfather. Grievant had an uneasy relationship with the Fosters.
28. Mr. Foster noticed Sabrina's bruises. He asked Sabrina about the bruises and she
told him that the bruises were caused by Grievant.
29. Mr. Foster, then called the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Department. Detective Leslie
Collins of the Juvenile Division of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office was assigned to
investigate the matter.
30. Sabrina spoke with Detective Collins and told her that the bruises were caused by
Grievant during the incident regarding the locked refrigerator and telephone calls to Mrs.
Hummel.
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31. Betty Foster, Sabrina's maternal Grandmother testified that the bniises were fading
when she saw them on July 19,1989. Photographs taken on that date of Sabrina show very little
remaining bruising. In fact the bruises are difficult to see in the pictures at all. This indicates
that what bruising there was must have been caused on an earlier date, and were not very
serious.
32. Upon Sabrina'sreturnfrom Montana, Detective Collins placed Sabrina in protective
custody.
33. On July 19, and 20, 1989, Grievant and Mrs. Hummel were interviewed by
Detective Collins concerning the Fosters' allegations of child abuse. Grievant's mother had died
the night before the interview and both Grievant and Mrs. Hummel were emotionally distraught.
34. During the interview, Grievant admitted to Detective Collins that he had struck
Sabrina on the side of her face and had left a bruise.
35. Grievant was charged with a violation of Section 76-5-109(3)(a), Utah Code
Annotated (as then in effect), a Class A misdemeanor commonly called "child abuse". On
August 14, 1989, Grievant entered a plea of guilty to the criminal charge, believing that by
doing so he would obtain a dismissal of the charge pursuant to a plea bargain.
36. Pursuant to assignment from the Court, Ms. Gwen Rowley from the Agency
interviewed Grievant. During this interview, Grievant signed a statement indicating that he had
"slapped her with my left hand-later leaving a bruise on her face." Grievant also admitted to
striking Sabrina in the past.
37. Grievant told Ms. Rowley that if he lost his job he wished, and would cause,
Sabrina to leave the home on a permanent basis .
38. While Grievant was in jail, Grievant had a telephone conversation with Mrs.
Hummel wherein Mrs. Hummel indicated that Sabrina had recanted her testimony.
39. Mrs. Hummel indicated that Sabrina was now alleging that Tori's ex-husband, Mike
Chacon, had caused the bruises.
40. On November 5, 1989, Mr. Rick Cobia of the Division of Family Services, who
was assigned to monitor the Hummels, visited with Grievant's family.
41. Sabrina told Mr. Cobia that Tori's "ex-husband Mike" had caused the bruising after
Sabrina had knocked some "white powder" off the kitchen table around which Sabrina and Tori's
daughter, Sheree, were playing.
42. Present in the room during the recantation to Mr. Kobia were Mrs. Hummel and
Grievant,
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43. On or about April 25, 1990, Grievant appeared before the Agency's Administrative
Law Judge, R. Spencer Robinson, for a hearing on the Agency's Administrative Complaint.
During the hearing, Sabrina, under oath, testified that she had falsely accused her father and that
she had been injured by Tori's "ex-husband Mike." Sabrina restated the story regarding how
she and her cousin Sheree were playing around the kitchen table and had knocked some white
powder off that table, at which time a man in Tori's house struck and kicked Sabrina.
44. The Administrative Law Judge found that Sabrina'srecantationwas not credible.
45. On or about May 25, 1990, an article appeared in The Salt Lake Tribune describing
a drug arrest at Tori's house for amphetamines, involving Drew McDonald, Tori's husband.
46. Subsequent to the May 25, 1990, newspaper article, Sabrina's story changed to
indicate that it was Drew McDonald who caused the bruising, and not the "ex-husband Mike".
47.
The Hearing Officer concludes that Sabrina is inherently incredible and
untrustworthy, and nothing she has said since sometime before 1988 concerning her parents and
herrelationshipwith her parents can be safely believed without strong corroborating evidence.
48. While there is some corroborating evidence of the new story now being told by
Sabrina concerning the white powder and the actions of Mr. McDonald, by way of the evidence
that Mr. McDonald is a convicted drug dealer and that he did produce and sell illegal drugs in
a white powder form, there is substantial evidence to support the Agency's finding that Grievant
did strike Sabrina on one or more occasions in a manner constituting child abuse as defined in
Utah statutes, L&. striking Sabrina and leaving a bruise with a mental intent sufficient to
constitute a crime.
49. In summary, there is substantial evidence to support a finding that on at least one
occasion, and probably others, Grievant did strike Sabrina with sufficient force to cause some
minor bruising in an effort to discipline Sabrina for her apparent violations of the Hummel
family's code of proper conduct.
50. There is not substantial evidence to support the finding of the Agency that Grievant
struck Sabrina or any of his children with either his service belt or a clip from his service
weapon. Such contentions are supported solely by hearsay and childish fantasy and pique.
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-The Allegations of Conduct Bringing Discredit to the Agency.
51. After talking with the Grievant, Mrs. Hummel and Sabrina, Detective Collins
concluded that, although there were problems in the home between the Hummels and their
children, charges should be filed to show Grievant how seriously he should reconsider his
corporal punishment policies. However, based on the circumstances she observed, because
Grievant and Mrs. Hummel were amenable to obtaining counseling, Detective Collins concluded
that Grievant did not deserve to lose his job; and believing that she could forestall the loss of
Grievant's job, Detective Collins informed Grievant that she wouldrecommenda plea agreement
to the prosecutor, whereby Grievant would plead "guilty" to a Class B Misdemeanor of "child
abuse1', in exchange for a promise that his plea would be held in abeyance and dismissed, if
Grievant and Mrs. Hummel would attend family counseling. Grievant and Mrs. Hummel agreed
to this arrangement.
52. In compliance with the plea agreement negotiated by Detective Collins, Grievant and
Mrs. Hummel began attending family counseling on a regular basis.
53. On August 14, 1989, Grievant appeared at the Circuit Court arraignment without
counsel and entered a plea of guilty "with an explanation" to the criminal charge, and advised
the Court of the plea agreement that had been reached.
54. The judge indicated to Grievant that he was not bound by the prosecutor's
recommendations and thereafter received his guilty plea in a manner violating Grievant's rights
under Utah law. Judge Griffithsrequestedthat a Presentence Investigation Report be performed
by the Department of Corrections.
55. Ms. Gwen Rowley, an employee of the Agency was assigned the task of preparing
the Presentence Investigation Report as ordered by Judge Griffiths.
56. Disturbed by the judge's comments at the arraignment about not being bound by the
plea bargain, Mrs. Hummel contacted Ms. Rowley. Ms. Hummel requested confirmation that
the plea agreement was in place and would be implemented by the Court at the time of
sentencing.
57. In response to Ms. Hummel's request, Gwen Rowley contacted Detective Collins
and confirmed that the plea agreement had been agreed to by the prosecutor and would be
accepted by the Court, and reported the same to the Grievant's wife.
58. In the interim between the Grievant's arraignment and sentencing of Grievant, Ms.
Rowley requested Grievant to execute a release so that she could discuss his case with Mr. Eric
Nielsen, Grievant's social worker.

-111

J*J

59. Pursuant to express instructions from Mr. Eric Nielsen, Grievant declined to sign
the release but promised to provide Ms. Rowley with a copy of Mr. Nielsen's report as soon
as Grievant received the report.
60. Thereafter, Ms. Rowley contacted Mr. Nielsen and attempted to get him to discuss
Grievant's case with her without a release having been executed, which Mr, Nielsen declined
to do. Mr. Nielsen advised Ms. Rowley that as soon as he completed his report, he would give
it to Grievant who would deliver the Report to Ms. Rowley. Grievant did submit a copy of the
report to Ms. Rowley as soon as he received it from Mr. Nielsen. Eric Nielsen testified that
Ms. Rowley was upset because Grievant had not signed the release. Mr. Nielsen Also
confirmed that he had told her that Grievant had not signed the release because of his
instructions.
70. As an apparent reprisal for Grievant's refusal to sign the release for Ms. Rowley to
discuss his case with Mr. Nielsen, Ms. Rowley, recommended that the plea agreement between
the State and Grievant be revoked, and that the Grievant be convicted and sentenced to jail.
71. An Agency Investigative Report, dated September 21,1989, listed Grievant's failure
to execute the requested release as an "aggravating circumstance'9 to the charges against him.
72. At no time prior to Grievant's appearance for sentencing, did Ms. Rowley ever
indicate to Grievant that a recommendation for jail time in his case had been made, despite the
plea agreement to the contrary.
73. In addition, although Ms. Rowley knew that Grievant was under the belief that the
Court would implement the plea agreement between the Grievant and the State, and thus had not
retained legal counsel to represent him in regard to the criminal charge, Ms. Rowley never
informed Grievant that she hadrecommendedthat the Court not follow the plea agreement, and
had recommended that Grievant be convicted and jailed.
74. On October 10, 1989, Grievant appeared for sentencing. Without any prior notice
to Grievant of her intention not to follow the plea agreement previously entered into by Grievant
and the State, the prosecutor revoked the plea agreement and recommended that Grievant be
convicted of the criminal charge and sentenced to jail.
75. During the sentencing, the judge told Grievant that he knew that Grievant's father
had been employed as a railroad detective, that the Judge had known railroad detectives and that
all of them were "bullies," that Grievant was a bully, and that the Judge was going to put
Grievant in jail as a lesson to him.
76. Thereafter, the Court convicted Grievant based upon his illegally obtained plea,
sentenced Grievant to pay a $300.00 fine and to perform 150 hours of community service.
Grievant asked that he be allowed to serve this time on weekends so that he would not lose his
job, but the Court refused and ordered that Grievant be committed to jail forthwith.
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77. At the time of his sentencing, Grievant was mentally and emotionally distraught over
the death of his mother and the charge of child abuse that had been made against him. The
Judge's cruel and unwarranted comments concerning Grievant and his father were humiliating
and emotionally difficult for Grievant to bear. Moreover, Grievant was surprised and
bewildered by the Court's refusal to implement the plea bargain between the parties, pursuant
to which Grievant and his wife had been attending counseling for two months.
78. At the point in the sentencing after the Judge had accused Grievant of being a bully
like his father, and stating that Grievant was not going to intimidate him, and that he shouldn't
be a police officer, Grievant stated "I appreciate your confidence in me."
79. Grievant acknowledges that he should not have made this remark to the Judge, and
that he did not mean to be disrespectful to the Judge or bring discredit on the Department by this
remark, or anything else he may have said in the hearing, and that he would not have made this
statement but for his distraught mental and emotional mental state resulting from being falsely
accused and publicly humiliated as a child abuser by the Judge, and his emotional distress over
his mother's death.
80. The Hearing Officer heard the audio tape of the sentencing proceedings before Judge
Griffiths and was able to judge the tone of the comments being made by both Judge Griffiths and
by Grievant, and has reviewed the manner in which Judge Griffiths deprived Grievant of his
Constitutional rights to due process of law. Substantial evidence does not support the Agency's
factual conclusion that Grievant acted in a way to bring discredit to the Agency at the sentencing
hearing. No unbiased member of the public could listen to Judge Griffiths' diatribe and not be
embarrassed at his lack of control or decorum. No unbiased member of the public can listen
to Grievant's comments and conclude that, under the circumstances and given their tone and
context, they brought discredit upon the Agency.

-The Agency's Allegations of Grievant's Failure to Notify His Superiors in Writing About
the Charge Filed Against Him.
81. During her interview with Grievant, Detective Collins informed Grievant that Bruce
Egan, one of his superiors at the Agency, had already been informed of the criminal charge
against Grievant.
82. Based upon this information, Grievant assumed that Mr. Egan would advise all other
necessary Agency personnel, and would probably call him in at some point to discuss the matter.
83. Grievant did not personally advise his immediate supervisor (Mr. Will Fowlke who
was subordinate to Mr. Egan) that he had been charged with a criminal offense because on prior
occasions, Grievant had witnessed these same lower level supervisors disseminating confidential
information regarding personnel matters to officers and department staff, and Grievant did not
want the information concerning the charges against him to become the subject of gossip and
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innuendo throughout the Agency, particularly when he understood from the beginning that the
charge was going to be dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement.
84. Grievant's statements to Ms. Rowley about his intention not toreportthe charge to
Will Fowlke were expressed under the stress of the moment and in the context of a belief that
responsible senior people at the Agency were aware of the charge as told to him by Detective
Collins.
85. Immediately following the sentencing, when for the first time Grievant became
aware that his charge would not be dismissed, Grievant instructed Mrs. Hummel to telephone
Grievant's immediate supervisor, Will Fowlke, to report the situation in full. This she did.
86. There is substantial evidence to support the finding that Grievant did not timely
report the charge made against him in writing to the Agency, as required by Agency rule.
However the Hearing Officer finds that there is substantial evidence of mitigating circumstances,
rather than aggravating circumstances, as found by the Agency, surrounding this infraction of
the Agency's rules.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Board and its Hearing Officer are authorized to resolve issues concerning
injustice or oppression occurring in the administration of the career service employment policies
and practices of the government of the State of Utah.
2. At Step 5, a complete reexamination of the facts is intended by a disinterested
Hearing Officer not connected with the Agency or the career service system.
3. Applicable rules of the Board and the statutes governing the Step 5 hearing process
require that the Agency findings of wrongdoing be upheld, after a de novo review of all of the
evidence if the agency findings were lawftil and supported by "substantial evidence",
4. If the Agency's findings of wrongdoing are supported by "substantial evidence", the
discipline imposed, if any, also must be found reasonable and appropriate under the
circumstances, with latitude and deference to the judgment of the agency in close cases. As
expressed by the Court of Appeals, the Agency is to be given "latitude and deference" as to the
discipline imposed, unless the "sanction is so clearly disproportionate as to amount to an abuse
of discretion." Department of Corrections vs. Despain. 824 P.2d 439 (Utah App. 1991).
5. "Substantial evidence" has been defined by the Utah appellate courts to be "more than
a mere scintilla of evidence", but less than "the weight of the evidence" (Le., a preponderance).
"Substantial evidence" is such quantum and type of "relevant evidence a > a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Zissi v. State Tax Commission. 842 P.2d
848, 853 (Utah 1992); Grace Drilling v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989).
.14.

If the Agency carries its burden of proof by offering "substantial evidence" in support of its
allegations, the Agency is to be upheld, as long as the Agency has also fairly and properly
applied relevant policies, rules and statutes, as determined by the Hearing Officer.
6. The issues in this case are whether the Agency had "just cause" for disciplining
Grievant (Le, whether there is substantial evidence that Grievant violated Agency policies as
alleged and found by the Agency), and if so, whether the discipline imposed by the Agency
(here termination of employment) is reasonable and appropriate.
7. Based upon his guilty plea to a violation of Section 76-5-109(3)(b), Utah Code
Annotated, and his conviction of a Class B misdemeanor, Grievant was charged by the Agency
with violating Policy AE 02.03.37 A(5), which states: "Any act or conduct that constitutes a
wrongful practice as defined by federal, state or local law is prohibited."
8. While there is no factual basis to support the Agency's finding that "Mr. Hummel
stands convicted, based on his guilty plea, of Child Abuse, a Class B misdemeanor", there is
substantial evidence that Grievant did in fact violate Section 76-5-109(3)(c), Utah Code
Annotated, under conditions that would make him guilty of a Class C misdemeanor, "child
abuse". This is a violation of AE 02.03.37 A(5), although a significantly less serious one that
the Class B misdemeanor that was the basis for the Agency's decision.
9. The Agency argues that Grievant actually violated Section 76-5-109(3)(a), a Class A
misdemeanor, because he admitted using the physical force that caused the bruising of Sabrina
in a conscious employment of corporal punishment. Thus, argues the Agency, Grievant inflicted
the "injury" intentionally or knowingly. This is an erroneous reading of the statute. An
"injury" is defined by the bruising, thus intentional or knowing infliction of an "injury" would
require, in this case, the intent to bruise Sabrina. There is no evidence of such an intent.
Rather the weight of the evidence suggests that the bruising occurred without any intent in
Grievant to cause it, but rather through the use of physical force that was negligently employed
strongly enough to cause bruising. This level of intent, called "criminal negligence" in the
statute, is only a Class C misdemeanor.
10. Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Grievant did violate AE 02/02.02
C, "Member Responsibility".
11. Substantial evidence does not support the conclusion that Grievant violated AE
02.03.01, "Standard of Conduct", and the Hearing Officer concludes that no such violation took
place.
12. The Hearing Officer also concludes that the ALI failed to give sufficient weight to
the mitigating circumstances in this case, including Grievant's prior good work history as
evidenced by his satisfactory performance evaluations, and the stressful circumstances in which
the events leading to the disciplinary action occurred.
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13. The Hearing Officer concludes that mitigating circumstances surround the violations
found to be supported by substantial evidence at Step 5, and that there is no substantial evidence
supporting the aggravating circumstances found to surround this violation by the Agency,
14. Even allowing for the -latitude and deference- to be given to the Agency's choice
of discipline: termination, asrequiredby the CSRB rules and the Court of Appeals in Despain.
it is obvious that the Agency's choice of discipline for Grievant was based on the findings by
the ALJ that all three alleged violations occurred, and after finding aggravating circumstances.
Moreover, the Agency had found that Grievant was guilty of a Class B misdemeanor based on
a confession. Based on the findings of the Hearing Officer that only two of the three alleged
violations occurred, that Grievant would be guilty of only a Class C misdemeanor, that the
Agency's aggravating circumstances were not supported by substantial evidence, and that
mitigating circumstances exist that were not fully understood or considered by the Agency, the
continuation of the Agency's imposition of maximum discipline based on its far different findings
would be an abuse of discretion and apparently unreasonable.
15. The Agency's ALJ found that in the relevant Agency cases where unlawful conduct
had been charged, the sanctions ranged from days off with pay to termination. However, in the
onlyreportedcase in which a corrections officer was changed with child abuse, 92 OLM 24-D,
Grievant's Exhibit 13, -Summary Of Department of Corrections' Disciplinary Actions"
(hereinafter -Summary-) Case No. 32, no disciplinary action other than an admonishment was
imposed on the officer, because, according to the order, no crime was charged by the police or
prosecutor.
16. Case 32 provides logic, consistency and precedent for a discipline less than
termination as appropriate for Grievant.
17. Grievant argues that Case 32 is also relevant because the complaining witness was
reunited with the officer, her husband, and subsequently recanted her complaint against the
officer. In that case, the Executive Director of the Agency determined that since the
complaining witness has testified falsely, either originally, or later, when she recanted, that her
testimony could be given Mno weight,- and that the officer had to receive "the benefit of the
doubt.- However, Grievant argues that when the complaining witness in the instant case
recanted her testimony, the Agency applied a different standard, rejected herrecantationand
insisted that her original testimony must be believed and Grievant disbelieved. However,
Grievant's own contemporaneous statements to Detective Collins and to Ms. Rowley corroborate
Sabrina's earlier, often repeated versions of how her injury was caused.
18. A review of other Agency cases described in Grievant's Exhibit 13, demonstrates
that officers with convictions for Class A felonies, even two, three or four convictions, received
discipline far less severe than the termination of employment to which Grievant was subjected.
In 1992, a corrections officer with four DUI felony convictions subject to dismissal pending
successful 2 years of unsupervised probation, was given a 30 day suspension without pay;
demoted from grade 25 to 22; relieved of supervisory roles for 1 year; barred from operating
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a state vehicle; and required to have a corrective action plan.
19. Cases 32 and 33 are recent cases that can fairly be used to judge the consistency and
logic of the Agency's discipline of Grievant
20. It must be concluded that the termination of Grievant's employment was so clearly
disproportionate to the factually supported misconduct, and so discriminatory, based upon the
lesser disciplinary sanctions meted out by the Agency for more serious crimes by officers, that
it amounts to an abuse of discretion.
21. Moreover, it is clear from the evidence that Grievant respects the Agency and
honors his job there, and is a dedicated employee who has never let the enormous stress of his
private life interfere with effective performance on the job.

DISCUSSION
In an effort to deprive true child abusers of any loopholes in the event of prosecution,
and based on an implicit and relatively recent Legislative policy decision that, essentially,
corporal punishment is to be discouraged, the Utah statutes defining the crime of "child abuse"
are broadly drafted, and suffer the anomaly that a parent can strike one child very hard and not
cause a bruise, and be free of criminal charges; but let the same parent strike another child with
the same force and cause a bruise, based on the physiology of the child, and criminal liability
ensues. This draconian legal scheme requires prosecutors, judges and juries, as well as the
Agency, to exercise empathy and discretion in the face of the great change in attitude that is
being caused in society between the prior generation and the current one on the issue of corporal
punishment by a parent in order to make just judgments and punish true abusers while
admonishing those who are simply loving but coiporal disciplinarians. At the end of this case,
I have to conclude that while he violated the law by means of a Class C misdemeanor, as found
by substantial evidence, Grievant is not a malevolent child abuser, and should be treated with
a greater measure of understanding and compassion than the Agency or Judge Griffiths were
willing to bestow.
As to the foundational conclusion that I have reached, that Grievant is guilty of a Class
C misdemeanor-and hence a violation of the Agency's policy against unlawful conduct, I am
troubled by the apparent ability of the Agency and the CSRB to find guilt of a crime on less than
the criminal standard of evidence: beyond a reasonable doubt. The Agency only needs a
preponderance and the Board only needs substantial evidence. While it is true that the Court
of Appeals in Despain implicitly held this variety of proof standards to be legal, it is not clear
from Despain that this issue was seriously considered and addressed affirmatively by the Court.
It bothers me that the Agency and the CSRB can deprive a person of his livelihood and
reputation in his profession based on less than the criminal standard of evidence which itself only
resulted in 30 days in jail and some community service. I believe that the law should require
that the Agency and the CSRB be required to judge allegations of criminal conduct on the higher
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standard of evidence applicable to criminal prosecutions.
The Agency offered Despain as the lodestar for deciding this case from start to finish.
I have carefully read Despain on a number of occasions, and am left to conclude that Despain
is distinguishable from the present case. First, we do not have here the double barrelled illegal
conduct of assault and DUI that were present in Despain. Moreover, the Despain record was
apparently devoid of the analysis of prior recent Agency disciplinary precedent available in this
case. While the CSRB and the Court of Appeals is free to analyze the evidentiary record to
judge the findings I have made based on what I found to be supported or not supported by
substantial evidence, I read Despain to support my conclusion that I must in fairness and justice
reinstate Grievant and direct an alternative discipline.
The Report and Recommendation of the Agency's ALJ concluded with a recommendation
for "a minimum of 30 days off without pay, reduction in grade, and placement in a position
where no weapon is required and contact with offenders is minimal, to a maximum of
termination. It is my conclusion that with the fewer and lesser violations and mitigating
circumstances found at the Step 5 level, termination of Grievant1 s employment with the Agency
is inappropriate, excessive and an abuse of discretion. On the other hand, 30 days off without
pay and reduction in grade would seem to be more consistent with prior Agency disciplinary
cases and closer to an appropriate level of discipline based on the Step 5 record. It also is
within the zone of the recommended discipline by the Agency ALJ, given the application of the
mitigating factors found by the Hearing Officer and the absence of any indication in the record
that Grievant has ever misused either his position vis a vis inmates or his service weapon. Based
on these latter factors, I decline to approve the removal of Grievant from a weapon-canying
assignment or the removal of Grievant from contact with inmates.
If 30 days suspension without pay was implemented as part of the appropriate discipline
nunc pro tunc as of the date of the Agency's final decision on discipline, Grievant has paid this
price many times over, Grievant has lived in Hell for the past few years and has paid a higher
price for his conduct an& beliefs than the Agency could ever lawfully impose.

DECISION AND ORDER
Grievant is to bereinstatedas an employee of the Agency with back pay from the date
of termination, provided, however, that
a) As a result of his violations of AB 02/03.37A(5), "Unlawful Conduct" and
AE 02/02.02 C, "Member Responsibility", Grievant is to bereinstatedat a grade
level one grade lower than the Grade 21 he served in at the time of this
termination;

-18v i?

b) As a result of his violations of AE 02/03.37A(5), "Unlawful Conduct" and
AR 02'02.02 C, "Member Responsibility", Grievant is to be credited with 30
rrn^nri^r days suspension without pay from the date of termination in calculating
tl ^ repayment of back pay;
c) Grievant is to be repaid back wages at the current Correctional Officer II
tn^jr ]0)? step 2 pay rate, and not at his former Correctional Officer DI pay
rate. Grie,vant is to have all of his State-paid benefits (term life insurance, full
rctii\ •. .it credits, health insurance plan, sick leave, annual leave, years of
servirr ir^nia! fr0m date of termination), and any other State-paid benefits that
he wo ul have received had he not been unjustly dismissed, but excluding all
StPte rr"-* holidays falling between the termination date and issuance of this
decision;
d) The back pay due to Grievant is to be paid to Grievant in one lump sum
together with interest at the rate of 10% per annum; and
e) The reinstatement of Grievant must be to meaningful and responsible duties
consistent with his new Correctional Officer n status as set forth in the State's
classification specification and his correctional work experience, and without
regard to this Grievance. The Hearing Officer is mindful of the assignment given
to Grievant when he was reinstated earlier, and the Hearing Officer will retain
jurisdiction over the implementation of this Decision to hear aUegations by either
the Ag^nry or Grievant that the other party is not implementing this Decision in
good faith.
DATED this 10th day of May, 1993.

A. Robert Thorujy,
Hearing Officer
RECONSIDERATION
Any request for reconsideration must be filed in writing with the Career Service Review Board within twenty days from the
date of issuance of this decision. (Utah Code Unannotated, (1992 Supp.) §63-46b-13.)
APPEAL
Any appeal of this decision must be filed in writing with the Career Service Review Board within ten working days upon
receipt of this decision. {Utah Code Unannotated (1992 Supp.), §67-19a-407(l)(a)(i).)
28067/art
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ADDENDUM E

BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In The Matter Of:

:

MICHAEL DEAN HUMMEL,
Grievant and Respondent,
v.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
Agency and Appellant.

:

DECISION AND FINAL
AGENCY ACTION

:
:
:
:
:
:

Case Nos. 5 CSRB 50 (Step 6)
11 CSRB/H.O. 151 (Step 5)

The Career Service Review Board (Board and CSRB) conducted an appellate level review
of the above-captioned case on November 30, 1993. The following Board Members heard both
parties' oral arguments and deliberated in an executive session immediately following: Chairman
Bruce T. Jones, Jean M. Bishop and David M. Hilbig.

Assistant Attorney General Ralph

Adams represented the Utah Department of Corrections (the Department), which is the appealing
party. Kathryn Collard, Attorney at Law, of COLLARD & RUSSELL, represented Michael
Dean Hummel (Mr. Hummel and Grievant), who was present. The above-mentioned appellate
proceeding is commonly referred to as a Step 6 or Board-level appeal hearing, and constitutes
the final administrative step in the State Employees' Grievance and Appeal Procedures.
The Department raised the following seven issues on appeal in its Step 6 Brief: I. the
Step 5 evidentiary record contains substantial evidence that Mr. Hummel: A. committed child
abuse, B. violated departmental policy by his failure to report his involvement with the criminal
justice system, and C. brought discredit to the Department by his remarks to a Circuit Court
judge; II. the CSRB hearing officer's findings of fact are dispositive that Mr. Hummel
committed child abuse on his minor daughter; III. the CSRB hearing officer did not correctly
interpret the Utah statute regarding child abuse; IV. the CSRB hearing officer's b i a ^ ' , ^

inappropriately influenced his evidentiary decision; V. the CSRB hearing officer inappropriately
relied upon inapposite evidence; VI. the remedy imposed upon the Department is not equitable;
and VII., the Department's dismissal of Mr. Hummel did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
Additionally, the Department submitted a Step 6 Reply Brief in response to Mr. Hummel's
Step 6 Brief.
The seven-day, Step 5 evidentiary proceedings before the CSRB hearing officer were held
on August 11, October 29, November 13,1992; February 1, 2, 3 and April 12, 1993. We have
sequentially numbered the seven separate transcript volumes in their chronological order as
volumes I through VII, respectively. Our citations to the case transcript volumes are cited, for
example, as T. II, 125, which stands for transcript volume II, page 125.
AUTHORITY
The CSRB's statutory authority is set forth at §§67-19a-101 through -408 of the Utah
Code Unannotated (Supp. 1993). The Board's administrative rules have been promulgated in
the current Utah Administrative Code (Supp. 1993). All the regulatory provisions therein are
applicable to these Step 5 and 6 grievance proceedings. The Board-level or Step 6 formal
adjudicatory proceeding constitutes a final agency action under the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act (UAPA), §63-46b-14.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case concerns two pivotal events separated by nearly two years' time: first, the
1989 judicial charge that Mr. Hummel had violated §76-5-109, a misdemeanor offense for child
abuse, which arose based upon an occurrence taking place on July 10, 1989, involving Grievant
and his then 11 year old daughter, Sabrina Hummel; and second, Grievant's dismissal from his
State employment by the Department effective May 28, 1991.
Grievant was arraigned before Salt Lake County Third Circuit Court Judge
LeRoy H. Griffiths, on August 14, 1989, on a (then) Class A (and later changed to Class B)
misdemeanor for alleged child abuse. Mr. Hummel, appearing without legal counsel, pled
a

guilty, with an explanation" during his arraignment hearing. However, Grievant at the time

believed in good faith that he had entered into a prior mutually agreed upon plea bargain with
both the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Department and the prosecuting attorney with the County
Attorney's Office. Thus, Grievant's understanding was that in pleading guilty to the child abuse
charge, his guilty plea would be held in abeyance for six months, he would be placed on
probation for one year, his charge diverted, and later dismissed provided he meanwhile
HUMMEL v. UDOC 5 CSRB 50
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completed certain family counseling requirements. However, at Mr. Hummel's sentencing on
October 10, 1989, Judge Griffiths stated that he was not bound by any prior plea bargain entered
into between county officials and Grievant. Consequently, the judge ascertained a guilty plea
from Mr. Hummel, and sentenced him immediately to begin serving a 30-consecutive day jail
term, fined him $300, and further committed him to serve 150 hours of community service.
During Mr. Hummel's incarceration, his wife informed him that their daughter Sabrina had
recanted her testimony by saying that it had been "another Mike," Neila Hummel's sister (i.e.,
Sabrina's aunt) Victoria1 ("Tori") Chicon's "ex-husband Mike" who had physically abused her
and left the complained of bruising marks, not her father. Grievant completed his jail sentence
and was released five days early on November 1, 1989. In the Hummel home on November 5,
1989, before both Hummel parents and State Social Services worker Richard "Rick" Cobia,
Sabrina stated that it had been Tori's ttex-husband Mike," not her father, who had caused her
physical bruising in July.
On November 20, 1989, the Department administratively charged Grievant with three
violations of its internal personnel Policies and Procedures:

(1) that through Grievant's

conviction of child abuse, at this time a Class B misdemeanor, he had allegedly violated policy
AE 02/03.37 A(5), "Unlawful conduct," (2) that Grievant's failure to report his criminal charge
in writing to his supervisor allegedly violated AE 02/02.02 C, "Member Responsibility," and
(3) that Grievant's conduct in a verbal exchange with Judge Griffiths on October 10, 1989,
allegedly violated AE 02.03.01 O, "Standard of Conduct."
On March 30, 1990, Mr. Hummel filed a first reconsideration motion in the Third
Circuit Court to have his guilty plea set aside and his conviction reversed. Grievant averred that
his plea before Judge Griffiths had been illegally taken.
reconsideration motion on April 20, 1990.

The court denied his first

Next, Grievant filed a second Motion for

Reconsideration on May 3, 1990, in which he offered the production of new evidence. After
a judicial hearing on June 11, 1990, again before Judge Griffiths, Mr. Hummel's second motion
to set aside his former guilty plea was denied on July 18/25, 1990. At the judicial appellate
level, the Utah Court of Appeals rejected Mr. Hummel's appeal on November 14, 1990, as
having been untimely filed, and thus affirmed the trial court's decision. On March 5, 1991, the
Utah Supreme Court denied Mr. Hummel's Writ of Certiorari.
Meanwhile, the Department had held an administrative proceeding on April 25, 1990,
regarding Grievant's having allegedly violated three of its internal personnel policies. On
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June 22,1990, Mr. Hummel's attorney motioned the Department for a stay of proceedings while
Grievant twice petitioned the Circuit Court to have his misdemeanor conviction set aside. Due
to Grievant's series of judicial appeals, the Department's administrative law judge (AU) held
his decision in abeyance until Mr. Hummel had exhausted his judicial appeals with the appellate
courts.

With the Utah Supreme Court's denial for certiorari on March 5, 1991, the

Department's ALJ issued his Report and Recommendation on May 10, 1991.

The AU's

recommendation concluded that Grievant had violated the three policies with which he had been
charged. The recommended decision proposed penalties ranging from a minimum of 30 days'
suspension with a reduction in grade and placement in a position with no duty weapon along
with only slight contact with inmates up to a maximum of dismissal. A Department official
effectuated Mr. Hummel's dismissal from his employment on May 28, 1991.

Thereafter,

Grievant filed a timely appeal with the CSRB from his dismissal with the Department.
Next, Mr. Hummel filed a Petition For Extraordinary Writ of Habeas Corpus with the
Third District Court to have his guilty plea set aside and his misdemeanor conviction vacated.
In an order dated January 2, 1992, Third District Court Judge Richard Moffat granted
Mr. Hummel's petition that reversed his conviction and set aside his former guilty plea. The
Third District Court had determined that Mr. Hummel's plea had been "unknowing and
involuntary as a matter of law." As Judge Moffat concluded that Grievant's plea in Circuit
Court had been unconstitutionally taken, he held that Mr. Hummel's plea had therefore been
illegally taken and vacated Grievant's conviction. Mr. Hummel now petitioned the District Court
to have his conviction records expunged and sealed. Effective December 11, 1992, the court
granted Mr. Hummel's petition and expunged his arrest and conviction records. Hence, with
the Court's expunging and sealing of Mr. Hummel's arrest and conviction records, this meant
that "the person who has received expungement and sealing of an arrest or conviction may
answer an inquiring employer as though the arrest or conviction did not occur," according to
§77-18-2, as amended.
Previously, when Mr. Hummel's counsel indicated her intent to file a Writ of Habeas
Corpus, the Department's former counsel had agreed to sign a joint Stipulation For An Indefinite
Stay pertaining to the CSRB forum, which he did on August 13, 1991. The CSRB Chairman
granted a requested Motion For Indefinite Stay on October 22,1991. After Mr. Hummel's prior
misdemeanor conviction was overturned on January 2, 1992, Mr. Hummel and his counsel
requested that the CSRB proceed with the evidentiary/step 5 proceedings before a hearing
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officer/presiding officer, whose appointment soon followed.

The evidentiary proceedings

commenced on August 11, 1992, and concluded on April 12, 1993.
la Ms Conclusion of Law number 20, the CSRB hearing officer made the following
ultimate conclusion:
It must be concluded that the termination of Grievant's
employment was so clearly disproportionate to the factually
supported misconduct, and so discriminatory, based upon the lesser
disciplinary sanctions meted out by the Agency for more serious
crimes by [other] officers, that it amounts to an abuse of
discretion. (Ibid., p. 17.)
Based upon the above determination, the CSRB Hearing Officer set forth a series of five
remedial steps, including reinstatement with back pay and benefits, minus a 30 days' suspension,
et cetera. From the foregoing determination, the Department filed a timely appeal to the Board
at Step 6 for an appellate proceeding under the State Employees' Grievance Procedures.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. The Department's Administrative Complaint Against Mr. Hummel
The Department's administrative complaint, dated November 3, and issued to
Mr. Hummel on November 20, 1989, charged him with three violations of departmental
policies, as follows: (1) violating AE 02/03.37 A(5), ttUnlawful conduct," for being convicted
of a Child Abuse Class B misdemeanor under Utah Code Annotated (1953), §76-5-109,
(2) violating AE 02/02.02 C, "Member Responsibility," for not informing his supervisors of his
child abuse judicial proceedings until being sentenced on October 10,1989, and (3) violating AE
02/03.01 O, "Standard of Conduct," for allegedly bringing discredit upon the Department due
to his conduct in court on October 10, 1989, before Judge Griffiths. In rendering judgment on
Mr. Hummel's employment status with the Department, the termination notice states:
There is substantial evidence [that] he stands convicted of child
abuse and that he did not report his involvement in the criminal
justice system as required. There is substantial evidence to
support the finding [that] his daughter's recantation is unreliable.
There is substantial evidence to support the finding [that]
Mr. Hummel acted inappropriately before Judge GRIFFITHS.
(Agency Exht. 19, p. 2.)
Consequently, Mr. Hummel was dismissed pursuant to the Department's May 28, 1991 uFinal
Order".
B. Issues Adjudicated at the Step 5 Proceedings
The CSRB noticed up the following twofold issues for the formal adjudication at Step 5
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of the State's grievance and appeal procedures:
1. Was Grievant dismissed for just cause?
2. If not, what is the appropriate remedy?
The Step 5 proceedings were held in compliance with the formal adjudicatory provisions of the
Utah Administrative Procedures Act, §§63-46b et seq., the statutory Grievance and Appeal
Procedures, §§67-19a-101 through -408, and the Utah Administrative Code (Supp. 1993), R1371-1 through -21.
C. The Board's Appellate Standards of Review
Effective November 2, 1992, the Board amended both its evidentiary and appellate
standards of review at R137-1-20 C. and R137-1-21 D., respectively.

Thus, the currently

amended version of R137-1-21 D. is applicable to the Department's appeal of this Board-level
review as was R137-1-20 C. applicable to the evidentiary/step 5 proceedings and decision. The
Board's currently applicable standard of review states:
D. The Board's Standards of Review. The board's standards of
review shall be based upon the following criteria:
1. The board shall first make a determination of whether the
factual findings of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and
rational in accordance with the substantial evidence standard. If
the board determines that the factual findings of the CSRB hearing
officer are not reasonable and rational based on the
evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, then the board may, in its
discretion, correct the factual findings, and/or make new or
additional factual findings.
2. Once the board has either determined that the factual findings
of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational or has
corrected the factual findings based upon the evidentiary/step 5
record as a whole, the board must then determine whether the
CSRB hearing officer has correctly applied the relevant policies,
rules, and statutes in accordance with the correctness standard,
with no deference being granted to the evidentiary/step 5 decision
of the CSRB hearing officer.
3. Finally, the board must determine whether the decision of the
CSRB hearing officer, including the totality of the sanctions
imposed by the agency, is reasonable and rational based upon the
ultimate factual findings and correct application of relevant
policies, rules, and statutes determined in accordance with the
above provisions.
The above-quoted regulatory provisions constitute the applicable standards upon which this
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appeal is being reviewed.
MATERIAL FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The lengthy seven-day, Step 5 evidentiary proceedings adduced a myriad of facts that
either directly underlie or to a varying degree tie into this case. Fourteen witnesses testified;
two testified more than once (Detective Collins and Grievant). Any background summary must
necessarily be selective by including some facts as well as excluding others. Therefore, in
sorting through the vast assortment of facts, central events and essential persons, the Board has
focused attention on the case's four paramount events: (A) The physical abuse incident of
Sabrina on July 10, 1989, and its aftermath over the next several days; (B) Sabrina's subsequent
recantation; (C) Mr. Hummel's alleged failure to notify his superiors in writing of his pending
judicial proceedings; and (D) Grievant's alleged misconduct of bringing discredit to his
employing agency during his sentencing on October 10, 1989, before Judge Griffiths. There are
substantial discrepancies associated with each of these four incidents.
A. The July 10, 1989 "Child Abuse" Incident
Mr. Hummel had been employed by the Department for approximately a year and onehalf when the Monday, July 10, 1989 bruising incident with Sabrina occurred. At that time
Grievant held the position of Security and Enforcement Officer III, at Grade 21, and had
certified peace officer status2 through Utah's POST Division. Mr. Hummel's particular duty
assignment placed him at the University of Utah Medical Center where he provided security over
hospitalized inmates. He worked graveyard shifts (approximately, midnight to 8:00 a.m.), and
generally arrived home not long after going off duty each morning. Neila Hummel, Grievant's
wife, left for her job at Meadow Gold Dairy about 6:00 or 6:30 a.m., four days per week. The
four Hummel children were not in school during the 1989 summer recess, and Sabrina (age 11)
had tending responsibilities for her three younger brothers, Rick (age 10), Gary (age 5), and
Michael, a seven months' old infant! Sabrina had been given the child tending responsibility
during early morning hours of caring for her younger brothers because of her parents' work
schedules. The Hummel parents worked staggered shifts to care for Mr. Hummel's seriously
ill, bedridden mother, who lived with them. Sabrina had sole children tending responsibility
until her father arrived home, and then she shared that responsibility with him during the day
until Neila returned from work.
On the morning of July 10, 1989, Neila Hummel had left early for work as usual;
however, her husband did not arrive home until about 10:30 or possibly 11:00 a.m. due to some
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extended job responsibilities. Unknown to Sabrina, Rick had telephoned their mother a couple
of times that morning already, as had Sabrina once earlier. Mrs. Hummel was then under
standing instructions from her employer to accept only emergency-related telephone calls from
her children, but not their personal, childish calls. When Michael, the Hummel infant, began
crying around 9:00 or 9:30 a.m., Sabrina believed that he was hungry and needed food from the
refrigerator. Mrs. Hummel kept the family refrigerator chained with handcuffs and locked so
that her children could not obtain food outside of mealtimes. She did not want her children,
particularly Rick, snacking on desserts between meals, leaving items such as milk out on the
table or consuming large portions of food set aside for the entire family's meals. On this day
Neila Hummel had left some food for her baby outside the refrigerator, but Sabrina was not
aware of this set aside food. Also, Sabrina believed her infant brother especially needed milk
from the refrigerator, so she telephoned her mother at work, not knowing Rick had called her
at least twice already that morning. Mrs. Hummel told Sabrina how to retrieve the key to the
refrigerator lock, which Sabrina did, and Sabrina obtained the needed food from the refrigerator.
Sabrina fed Michael, gave him some milk, and afterwards locked the refrigerator again.
Later, around noon, Neila Hummel called her husband and said she was having difficulty
with her employer because of her children's personal telephone calls. Neila complained to
Grievant that due to her children's several telephone calls that morning, her job was being
placed in jeopardy because her employer had previously warned her not to have personal calls
other than emergency telephone calls. Afterwards, Mr. Hummel held a stern discussion with
Sabrina and Rick in which he admonished them not to make telephone calls to their mother
during working hours, that their mother's employer had just complained about this to their
mother (T. VI, 66-67). Mr. Hummel claimed that there was neither a confrontation nor any
physical demonstration. After the conversation, according to Grievant, both Hummel children
went their separate ways in the house and the incident was over. Sabrina later told authorities
that Mr. Hummel had struck Rick in the stomach and caused him to cry. Also Sabrina stated
to Detective Collins that her father had hit her about the head, arms and back; she had put up
her arms to protect her head, thus receiving bruises on her arms (Agency Exhts. 13, pp. 6-7;
16, p. 2).
That Monday evening, July 10, 1989, Mr. Hummel was downstairs watching TV when
he heard Neila's and Sabrina's loud voices in the kitchen, upstairs. According to Mrs. Hummel,
she reported having "confronted Sabrina upstairs in the kitchen" regarding excessive personal
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telephone calls to her at work. Neila stated that Sabrina then "called me a fucking bitch and
Mike came up and he slapped her across the face on her left cheek" (T. IV, 24, 43; V, 46, 84,
130; Agency Exht. 5). Provoked by what he perceived as highly disrespectful and vulgar
language, Mr. Hummel struck Sabrina once on Sabrina's left facial cheek with his open left hand
(Agency Exht. 3). Sabrina left the kitchen for her bedroom where she stayed for some time,
and even later ate dinner in her room.
On Friday morning, July 14, 1989, Grievant returned home from work and exchanged
"good-byes" with Sabrina and Neila in the driveway. Mrs. Hummel then drove Sabrina and
Michael to Tori McDonald's home. Neila dropped off both Sabrina and Michael at her sister's
home. Michael was there that day for his regular child tending by Tori, but Sabrina and her ten
year old cousin Cherie, and Cherie's younger sister, Cecilia (age 5), were to be taken by Tori
over to the Bruce Foster residence in Woods Cross later that day. Cherie and Sabrina were to
spend the night of July 14 at the Foster's home. Then on Saturday, July 15, Tori and Drew
McDonald, Bruce and Betty Foster, Sabrina, Cherie, and Cecilia were to drive by motor home
to Montana to visit Neila's and Tori's younger sister, Gina, for a vacation.
When Neila, Sabrina, and Michael arrived at Tori's home on Friday morning, Tori,
Tori's male companion (Drew McDonald), and minor children, Cherie and Cecilia, were at
home. Tori noticed bruises on Sabrina's face, while the latter was watching morning TV shows,
and inquired as to the bruises' origin. Sabrina first told her aunt that the Hummel cat had
scratched her and caused them. Under further questioning by Tori, Sabrina admitted that her
father had caused them. Sabrina explained to Tori about Monday's locked refrigerator episode
concerning her getting food for Michael, along with the morning telephone calls to her mother,
and finally a resulting argument with her father. Later that Friday, Tori took Sabrina to Bruce
and Betty Foster's home. Bruce Foster was Sabrina's step-grandfather and Tori and Neila's
stepfather; Betty Foster was the mother of Neila, Tori and Gina, and their children's
grandmother. Mr. Foster stated that he had not noticed Sabrina's bruises until he hugged her
and she complained of discomfort due to her bruises (T. HI, 42). He asked Sabrina what had
caused her bruises. According to Foster, Sabrina told him that her father had caused them in
connection with the locked refrigerator incident.
While at the Foster home, Tori called her Social Services' welfare worker and inquired
about how to report Sabrina's bruising to authorities. Foster then called the Sheriffs Office.
Detective Leslee Collins, Sheriffs Juvenile Division, and a police photographer arrived in the
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afternoon. Color photos of Sabrina's head, face and arm were taken. After Sabrina had been
interviewed and photographed, the McDonalds and Fosters continued with their plans for the
vacation motoring trip to Montana. Next day, July 15, the two families departed on their
motoring trip to Montana as planned. Betty Foster stated that she did not notice Sabrina's
bruises on Friday. Mrs. Foster first noticed bruises on Sabrina's back as Sabrina stepped out
of a bath on Saturday morning (T. II, 94, 95).
While Sabrina was in Montana, Mr. Hummel's long-term, bed-ridden, invalid mother
died on July 17. The Hummel parents telephoned Gina and the Fosters in Montana and arranged
for Sabrina to return. Sabrina returned with the Fosters and McDonalds on July 24, and was
placed in protective custody by Detective Collins on that day, although Sabrina was allowed to
attend a family gathering (without the Hummels) at Bear Lake. Detective Collins stated that she
had placed Sabrina in a shelter on July 29, 1989, because the Hummels did not want Sabrina
staying any longer with the Fosters. There were now bad feelings between the Hummels and
the Fosters over the latter's reporting of Sabrina's bruising to authorities. These hard feelings
between the Hummels and the McDonalds and Fosters continued for the next several years right
up to the evidentiary hearing (Betty Foster, T. II, 87). Apparently there has been no direct
contact between these families in the intervening three to four years.
Detective Collins investigated the complaint of Mr. Hummel's having physically bruised
Sabrina on July 10, and interviewed both parents after the funeral of Mr. Hummel's mother
(Agency Exhts. 15, 16). Sabrina told Detective Collins that her bruises had been caused by
Grievant and that they stemmed from the incident over the locked refrigerator and the earlier
telephone calls to Mrs. Hummel at her employment.
Moreover, Detective Collins had been involved with the Hummel family just eight
months' previously. Back in December 1988, both Sabrina and Rick had reported to their
teachers that Grievant regularly abuses them. On November 30, 1988, school authorities called
the Sheriffs Juvenile Division and Detective Collins responded and investigated.

Sabrina

complained that her father was "constantly kicking and hitting" her and Rick, and even their
then-pregnant mother. More specifically, Sabrina and Rick had reported that on the previous
evening, their father had become upset over not being able to find his brass "keepers" (i.e.,
fasteners for attaching his duty weapon/equipment belt to his uniform trousers' belt). Because
his keepers were not in their usual place, Grievant believed his children had played with and
misplaced them. In searching for his keepers, Grievant admitted tossing an old school lunch box
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filled with Matchbox toy autos at Rick and hitting him. Rick told Detective Collins that the
lunch box had hit his left arm. Rick had a bruise on his left arm, but there were no bruises or
marks on Sabrina (Collins, T. Ill, 6). Both Rick and Sabrina were taken briefly into protective
custody pending an investigation. At the Step 5 hearing, Sabrina testified that she had made up
the 1988 allegations to get even with her mother. Sabrina testified that she had become piqued
with her mother for not taking time before school to arrange Sabrina's hair for a special school
photo to be taken on the morning of November 30, 1988. Neila testified that Sabrina's problem
stemmed from her daughter not getting out of bed in time for Neila to fix her hair that morning.
Because the Hummel parents had agreed to enter into family counseling sessions
designed to help them deal more positively with their children, the County Attorney's Office
decided not to prosecute over the children's abuse allegations. The Hummels faithfully attended
all 11 family counseling sessions, albeit they both felt these counseling sessions were more
useful for dealing with younger children, such as Gary and Michael, not those on the threshold
of adolescence as were then Sabrina and Rick.
One prior incident, which had occurred in 1979, had also been reported to authorities.
When Sabrina was 18 months old, a day care provider had noticed several red marks on her
buttocks and lower back. The day care tender reported her concern to
welfare authorities. Sabrina was taken into protective custody briefly, but no charges were filed
with this complaint. Both Hummel parents acknowledged that Sabrina had been spanked as to
influence her "potty-training."
On July 18 and 19, 1989, Detective Collins interviewed Mr. and Mrs. Hummel together
and separately regarding Sabrina's recent bruises. Detective Collins had waited until after the
funeral of Mr. Hummel's mother as both parents were distraught over her death.

During

Detective Collins' interviews, Grievant admitted having struck Sabrina on the left side of her
face, which left a bruise, but stated this slapping incident occurred during the evening. This
slapping incident took place when Sabrina bad-mouthed her mother in the kitchen, not during
the day over the telephone calls to Mrs. Hummel, according to Grievant. A few days later,
Mr. Hummel was formally charged with violating §76-5-109(3)(a), then a Class A misdemeanor
for child abuse. On August 14,1989, Grievant appeared in Circuit Court and pled "guilty, with
an explanation" to the criminal charge.

Mr. Hummel had appeared without legal counsel

because he believed that he would obtain a dismissal of the charge through a plea bargain, the
details of which had already been agreed upon with authorities (T. V, 137-38).
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Nevertheless, disregarding both parties' plea agreement, the judge requested a
Presentence Investigation Report from Ms. Gwen Rowley, an Adult Probation and Parole
(AP&P) Presentence Investigator with the Department, and openly stated that he was not bound
by any such plea agreement. Later, in an interview with Ms. Rowley, Mr. Hummel signed a
statement admitting that he had "slapped [Sabrina] with my left hand—later leaving a bruise on
her face."

Additionally, Grievant admitted striking Sabrina on past occasions, including

spanking her. Grievant stated to Ms. Rowley that if he were to lose his job, he would place
Sabrina permanently outside his home somewhere else. Mr. Hummel made a similar statement
to Detective Collins.
B. Sabrina's Later Recantation
During the latter part of Mr. Hummel's incarceration between October 10 and
November 1, 1989, Sabrina first told her mother and later her father while he was still in jail
that it had not been Grievant who was responsible for her multiple bruises of July 10/14. On
November 5, 1989, Rick Cobia, a social services case worker with the Division of Family
Services (DFS) visited the Hummel home on assignment to monitor the Hummels. Sabrina told
Mr. Cobia that it was not her father who had caused her bruises which others saw on July 14,
1989. Sabrina told Cobia that she had knocked some "white powder" off Tori's kitchen table
while she and her cousin Cherie had been playing and running around the table. In his near
contemporaneous report written a month after this meeting, Cobia recorded that Sabrina had said
that TORI SMITH'S ex-husband hit her on both sides of the face, leaving redness and
bruising," (Agency Exht. 7). Both Mr. and Mrs. Hummel were present at this meeting in the
Hummel home along with Rick Cobia and Sabrina.
On April 20, 1990, in a reconsideration proceeding before Circuit Court Judge Griffiths,
Sabrina twice stated under oath that it had been Tori's "boyfriend" (not "ex-husband Mike")
who had struck her for knocking the white powder off the kitchen table (Agency Exht. 20, p. 9),
although at one point she said "ex-boyfriend."

(Ibid., p. 7.)

Five days later at the

Department's administrative proceeding before the departmental ALJ on April 25,1990, Sabrina
again recanted under oath. She stated that it was not her father who had caused her bruising,
but "a male by the name of Mike present at her Aunt Victoria Smith's home," (Agency
Exht. 18, p. 3).

Sabrina related how she had been running around the kitchen table that

morning of July 14,1989, when she knocked some white powder from the table. In the CSRB's
evidentiary proceedings, Sabrina testified that it had been one of her aunt's "boyfriends" who
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"I thought his name was Mike because just that's what I thought his name was, because I've
always heard of a Mike there. But from what I hear, I guess his name wasn't Mike. It was
Drew," (T. IV, 26). Neither Judge Griffiths nor the Department's A U found Sabrina's recanted
April 1990 versions persuasive.
On May 25, 1990, an article appeared in The Salt Lake Tribune regarding a May 10
metro narcotics strike force raid at Drew McDonald's house, in which at that time, Tori's
daughter Cherie had been temporarily living (Grvt. Exht. 4; Sawaya, T. IV, 9, 14). This event
identified Drew McDonald as a drug seller of amphetamines, a sometimes off-white powder
(T. IV, 10, 11), who was criminally charged on this occasion (T. IV, 17). With the publication
of this news article, Sabrina changed her "bruising story" so that it was Drew McDonald by
name, and not "ex-husband Mike" or ex-boyfriend Mike, who had caused her bruising on
July 14, 1989 (T. IV, 28). According to Sabrina's newest version, Aunt Tori told her to blame
her father, not Drew McDonald, for her bruises {Ibid.). Thus, Drew McDonald, who was a
convicted drug dealer at the time of these evidentiary proceedings, was present in Tori's house
on July 14, 1989. While it is possible to draw an inference that Drew McDonald was involved
with a controlled substance composed of white powder on the latter date due to his presence in
Tori's house, there is no corroborating evidence to suggest he struck Sabrina one or more times,
other than Sabrina's recanted version. The testimony of all the adults who saw Sabrina's bruises
on July 14, was very specific that Sabrina's bruises were old and faded: Bruce Foster (T. HI,
44), Betty Foster (T. II, 86-87, 93), and Detective Collins (T. m , 15, 34). Therefore, Sabrina's
bruises could not have been inflicted on July 14, as she claims.

Accordingly, the CSRB

evidentiary examiner made a relevant finding that:
The Hearing Officer concludes that Sabrina is inherently incredible
and untrustworthy, and nothing she had said since sometime before
1988 concerning her parents and her relationship with her parents
can be safely believed without strong corroborating evidence
(Finding No. 47).
C. Grievant's Failure to Notify his Supervisor in Writing
Detective Leslee Collins told Mr. Hummel during her July interviews with him that she
had already contacted Corrections' Department Deputy Director Bruce Egan about the charge
pending against him (T. n, 99, 107-108; T. V, 143; Agency Exht. 1, p. 7). Mr. Hummel
assumed that Mr. Egan would notify Grievant's chain of command supervisors (T. V, 141-42).
Consequently, Mr. Hummel did not, himself, notify Will Fowlke, the Enforcement Bureau
Director, or other supervisors-either verbally or in writing-of his then pending criminal charge
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before his October 10, 1989 sentencing (T. VI, 88). Grievant acknowledged that he had failed
in his duty to notify his supervisors of the charge pending against him (T. VI, 74). Upon
inquiry as to why he had not notified one or more supervisors, Mr. Hummel expressed concern
that in the past other lower level supervisors had revealed confidential information about their
subordinates, especially regarding personnel matters (T. V, 164; VI, 72). Mr. Hummel believed
that just being tagged with the label of child abuser could embarrass him, while the plea bargain
was yet pending resolution (T. VI, 87). According to Mr. Hummel, with his child abuse charge
held in abeyance then diverted and later dismissed, as already agreed upon by county authorities,
there would be no conviction and therefore no violation of departmental policy. On that basis,
together with having knowledge that Detective Collins had notified Corrections' Deputy Director
Bruce Egan, he did not comply with his member responsibility provision of AE 02/02.02 C ,
before October 10, 1989.
On August 22, 1989, AP&P Agent Gwen Rowley suggested to Grievant that he inform
Bureau Director Will Fowlke about his pending criminal charge. Mr. Hummel responded to her
that he did not intend to do so. The Hearing Officer made a factual finding that Gnevant's
comment was Expressed under the stress of the moment and in the context of a belief that
responsible senior people at the [Department] were aware of the charge as told to him by
Detective Collins," (Finding No. 75). Essentially, Grievant believed his criminal charge was
only a charge, and not a conviction. Mr. Hummel was dismayed to hear on October 10, 1989,
that he was being convicted contrary to his former plea bargain arrangement. Just after his
sentencing, Mr. Hummel instructed his wife to contact Will Fowlke that very day, and to notify
Fowlke of his sentencing and report the matter to him in full. Mrs. Hummel attempted to reach
Fowlke by telephone but failing to do so drove to the prison that day and talked with Fowlke
personally about her husband's incarceration (T. V, 68).

Where the Department listed

aggravating circumstances with Mr. Hummel not abiding by AE 02/0202 C , the CSRB
evidentiary examiner found substantial evidence of mitigating circumstances (Finding No. 77).
D. Gnevant's Alleged Conduct of Bringing Discredit to the Department
At the time of Mr. Hummel's arraignment on August 14, 1989, Sheriffs Deputy
Detective Collins and prosecutor Kim Hornak from the County Attorney's Office had reached
an understanding with Mr. Hummel that his guilty plea would be held in abeyance while he
successfully completed counseling and served a probationary term (Collins, T. HI, 28; Hummel,
V, 138). The Circuit Court judge, however, accepted Grievant's "guilty" plea but disregarded
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Mr. Hummel's "with an explanation" comment, and requested a presentence report from Adult
Probation and Parole (AP&P), (T. Court Proceedings, 2-3). Mr. Hummel's plea of aguilty,
with an explanation" was his way of referencing the previously agreed-upon plea bargain. The
Presentence Investigation Report was assigned to AP&P Investigator Gwen Rowley.
Concerned with the judge's comments about sentencing and disregarding the plea
agreement with county authorities, Neila Hummel contacted Investigator Rowley by telephone
and promptly met with her (T. V, 65). Mrs. Hummel wanted to learn about the status of the
plea bargain. Neila learned from Ms. Rowley that the latter had confirmed with Detective
Collins and County Prosecutor Hornak that the plea bargain was still acceptable (T. V, 66).
Ms. Rowley testified that she could not recall talking to Mrs. Hummel about the plea agreement
after Mr. Hummel's arraignment, she had no recollection and no notes about it (T. n, 145-46).
Investigator Rowley also did not tell Grievant that she was recommending a different sentence
from the plea bargain (T. n, 150, 151, 171). Detective Collins testified that she had favored
the counseling and abeyance recommendation until receiving "several phone calls from Gwen
Rowley about some problems that was [sic] occurring there [at AP&P]/ (T. HI, 23). Through
these several phone calls, Detective Collins was told by Ms. Rowley "about a lot of different
problems," concerning Mr. Hummel (Ibid.). After Grievant's arraignment, Detective Collins
changed her recommendation from a plea bargain with abeyance to supporting a 30-day jail term
for Mr. Hummel (T. Ill, 24-25). However, no authorities informed Mr. Hummel that the plea
bargain had by now been discarded. Thus, the Hummels believed that the plea agreement was
still in effect after the arraignment because no one told them otherwise, and their inquiries led
them to believe the agreement was still at hand (T. V, 65-66). Therefore, upon entering the
court room on October 10, 1989, for sentencing, Mr. Hummel was not sufficiently aware that
county officials had changed their position, and now favored a 30-day incarceration term for
him. County officials had no legal obligation to inform Grievant of their forsaking his plea
bargain; although they also knew that he would be appearing pro se in court without legal
counsel where he would be committed forthwith. Consequently, to Mr. Hummers astonishment
on October 10, 1989, he found himself being sentenced forthwith to jail that very day.
Under the Department's AE 02/03.01 O, Standard of Conduct policy, the agency charged
Mr. Hummel with having made disrespectful comments to the judge during his sentencing
proceeding. The Department relied upon the following particular remarks made by Grievant to
the judge during Grievant's sentencing (Agency Exht. 21, Sentencing Transcript): "Sir, I am
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the master of my house," (p. 11); UI am still the runner of my house," (p. 15); "Well, I
appreciate your confidence, sir," (p. 16). The court transcript shows that the judge followed
up these comments with: u. . . and I don't think you should be a police officer . . . ." {Ibid.),
"And I don't think the Department of Corrections needs any officers like you," (p. 16), followed
in part by, ". . . you can be sarcastic with me if you like . . . "

(Ibid.) Because the judge

mentioned the Department of Corrections as Mr. Hummers employer, the Department charged
Mr. Hummel with bringing discredit to the Department. When these comments are taken out
of their original context and culled from the full 20 pages of dialogue, they appear more
disrespectful and one-sided than when viewed in their original full sequence. Another important
factor is that the transcript pages do not give the reader the sentencing judge's tone of voice and
emotional range.
The Department viewed Mr. Hummel's remarks to the court as both sarcastic and
patently disrespectful (Agency Exht. 18). The CSRB hearing officer/presiding officer made
findings that Grievant was then distraught over his mother's recent death, that the odious label
of "child abuser" was being placed on him, and that the judge had made "cruel and unwarranted
comments concerning Grievant and his [deceased] father [that] were humiliating and emotionally
difficult for Grievant to bear," (Finding No. 68). According to the Step 5 Decision, it was after
the judge "had accused Grievant of being a bully like his father, and stating that Grievant was
not going to intimidate him, and that he shouldn't be a police officer, [that] Grievant stated 'I
appreciate your confidence, sir,'" (Finding No. 69).

At the evidentiary proceedings

Mr. Hummel admitted he should not have spoken disrespectfully to the judge nor did he mean
to bring discredit to the Department by this remark, and that he would not have made such a
remark but for the judge's patronizing tone and surly comments (Finding No. 70). The CSRB
hearing officer attributed Grievant's remark to have been induced by "his distraught mental and
emotional state resulting from being falsely accused and publicly humiliated as a child abuser
by the Judge, and his emotional distress over his mother's death" (Finding No. 70). As an
independent trier of fact, the Board's hearing officer had the opportunity to analyze the court
transcript (Agency Exht. 21) and to listen to the tape recording of the court proceedings that
provided tone, voice inflection, and volume that convey the attitude of both speakers. Based
upon substantial evidence, the CSRB examiner assessed the conduct of both the judge and
Grievant as follows:
Substantial evidence does not support the Agency's factual
conclusion that Grievant acted in a way to bring discredit to the
HUMMEL v. UDOC 5 CSRB 50
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Agency at the sentencing hearing. No unbiased member of the
public could listen to Judge Griffiths' diatribe and not be
embarrassed at his lack of control or decorum. No unbiased
member of the public can listen to Grievant's comments and
conclude that, under the circumstances and given their tone and
context, they brought discredit upon the Agency (Finding No. 71).
Importantly, the hearing officer noted that the above-quoted comments occurred within the
setting of the court's depriving Mr. Hummel "of his Constitutional rights to due process under
law." (Ibid.)
DISCUSSION
We turn now to review the Department's seven points raised in their Step 6 Brief. The
Department first maintains that substantial evidence supports findings of Grievant's being guilty
of child abuse, that he violated policy for his failure to report, and that he brought discredit to
the Department.
I.
A, Grievant's Child Abuse Misconduct
The Department avers that substantial evidence supports findings that: Grievant was
guilty of child abuse, he violated a departmental policy in failing to report his involvement with
the criminal justice system, he violated an agency policy by bringing discredit to the
Department.
This Board has no jurisdiction over criminal cases.

Therefore, the Board lacks

jurisdiction to assess what criminal offense, if any, has been committed by an offending
employee. Furthermore, the Board is concerned only with employment conduct (or misconduct),
not criminal intent or lack thereof. As a civil service entity, we may only consider what an
employee actually did, not what the employee may have intended to do. If a court of law had
adopted specific factual findings of criminal code violations, this Board would have adopted
those findings as being dispositive to our proceedings.
Given Mr. Hummel's circumstances, the Circuit Court unlawfully took his guilty plea
on August 14, 1989; therefore, the Third District Court reversed his guilty plea and vacated his
former child abuse conviction on January 2, 1992 (Grvt. Exhts. 5, 6).

Consequently,

Mr. Hummel currently has neither a guilty plea record nor a criminal conviction record. Absent
either the guilty plea record or the criminal conviction record, it cannot be shown that
Mr. Hummel violated the Department's AE 02/03.37 A(5) unlawful conduct policy. The matter
of law subsumes the question of evidentiary proof.
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B. Grievant's Failure to Report
The Department alleged that Grievant violated its member responsibility policy, AE
02/02.02 C , which states:
Members shall report in writing to a superior officer incidents or
occurrences involving an omission or violation of the rules,
regulations and requirements set forth in this chapter.
The Department's Administrative Complaint document (Agency Exht. 17) stated:
It is alleged that you did not notify your supervisor of the charges
filed against you.
Your supervisor was not notified until
October 10, 1989, the day you were sentenced. Your wife spoke
with Bureau Director Will Fowlke, after Judge Griffith[s] had
imposed a thirty day sentence to commence forthwith.
The Department's policy clearly states that a member "shall report in writing to a superior
officer." The language does not mention or specifically require written notification to "your
supervisor," as set forth in the complaint. There is a substantial difference between being
required to notify "your supervisor" and "a superior officer." Mr. Hummel knew by July 19,
1989, that Detective Collins had notified Corrections' Department Deputy Director Bruce Egan
regarding the pending child abuse charge against Grievant. Thus, "a superior officer" was
notified, but not directly by Mr. Hummel nor in writing by Mr. Hummel, as required by policy.
Yet, technically, there was no policy violation at the arraignment on August 14, 1989. There
was no sentencing on that date, and thus no conviction, therefore no policy violation, either.
In fact, both Mr. and Mrs. Hummel inquired over the next several days regarding the status of
his plea bargain, and whether it was still in effect.

No one in authority told Mr. or

Mrs. Hummel that the prosecution was no longer considering the plea agreement as previously
accepted: not Prosecutor Kim Hornak, not Detective Leslee Collins, and not AP&P Agent
Gwen Rowley.
Not until the sentencing hearing before the Circuit Court on October 10, 1989, was
Grievant fully informed via notice that the parties' plea agreement had been unilaterally set
aside, upon his being convicted, sentenced and immediately incarcerated on that day.
Admittedly, on that date Mr. Hummel did not provide written notification to his supervisor,
Bureau Director Will Fowlke, although he directed Mrs. Hummel to telephone Mr. Fowlke
immediately. Unable to reach Mr. Fowlke by telephone, she drove to the Draper-site prison
facilities, met with, and explained to Mr. Fowlke her husband's circumstance of being
committed to county jail earlier that day.

HUMMEL v. UDOC 5 CSRB 50

-1S-

016*

Policy AE 02/02.02 C. required to notify "a superior officer," but not necessarily or
specifically "his supervisor. " Mr. Hummel knew on July 19, 1989, that Detective Collins had
notified Deputy Director Egan, but Hummel himself had not done the notifying, nor had he done
so in writing as stipulated by the policy. Grievant's remark to AP&P Agent Rowley that he did
not intend to report the charge to Will Fowlke was considered by the CSRB hearing officer in
his Factual Findings numbers 74 and 75. The evidentiary examiner cited some grounds for
mitigating the effects of this policy violation. In sum, Mr. Hummel had a duty to inform a
superior officer by writing of the charge against him.

He knew that Mr. Egan had been

informed, but that was done not by him nor in writing. On the day of his sentencing he did not
inform his supervisor in writing, but he directed his wife to act as his representative. While
Grievant should have acted more responsibly in notifying "a superior officer" in writing of his
pending criminal charge before the day of his sentencing, there were several mitigating grounds
present: Mr. Egan had been notified; the policy requires only notification to a superior officer,
not specifically notification to one's immediate supervisor; on the same day that Mr. Hummel
was sentenced, he succeeded in having his immediate supervisor notified verbally (though not
in writing); Grievant had a concern regarding loose talk about employees' personal and
personnel matters by some supervisors at his work cite which inhibited him because of his
concern anent being labeled ua child abuser"; and, Mr. Hummel had a reasonable basis to
believe up till October 10, 1989, that the child abuse charge would be dismissed pursuant to the
plea agreement. The CSRB trier of fact made correct factual findings that were both reasonable
and rational, including the foregoing mitigating factors that he found.
C. Grievant's Bringing Discredit to the Department
The Department claims that Grievant violated agency policy AE 02/03.01 O., Standard
of Conduct, by his "defiant and sarcastic comments and attitude before the sentencing judge,"
(Step 6 Brief, p. 14). On appeal, the Department cites several of Grievant's remarks as having
brought discredit to it. The complained of remarks include: ttI am the master of my house,"
"I am the runner of my house," and after Judge Griffiths commented that, "I don't think the
Department of Corrections needs any officers like you," Grievant responded, ttI appreciate your
confidence, sir." By selecting out these specific remarks from their original context distorts the
dialogue between the court and Mr. Hummel.
Concededly, Grievant made the above-quoted comments but he did so by suffering
comments such as these by the court:
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THE COURT: Well, let me tell you a few things about your
father that I—
Mr. Hummel: Okay.
THE COURT: You have put your father up as a role model and
your father was a railroad detective, and I grew up around those
guys, and by and large, most of them were just bullies. And you
have learned to be a bully from your father.
Mr. Hummel: Well, I don't consider my dad a bully, sir.
THE COURT: They picked on hobos and people who road [sic]
the rails illegally, and they learned to be very, very cruel people,
some of them. And you learned to be cruel and from your dad.
And you are acting that way now.
And continuing further:
Mr. Hummel: And I have all due respect for you, Judge,
however, I am still the runner of my house.
THE COURT: Yeah, but see, I've got the last say here, see,
haven't I?
Mr. Hummel: Well—
THE COURT: Now, you can't brow-beat me, because I'm the
one who's going to be brow-beating you. (Agency Exht. 21,
pp. 11-12, 15.)
The CSRB hearing officer provided the first neutral, disinterested review by a formal
adjudicator outside the Department. The CSRB presiding officer listened to the audio tape of
the entire sentencing proceedings held on October 10, 1989, along with studying the transcript
of the aforementioned.
The evidentiary factfinder concluded that Mr. Hummel had not violated AE 02/03.01.
Pursuant to Utah Administrative Code, R137-1-21. D., the Board finds that its hearing officer
made reasonable and rational factual findings anent the allegation of Grievant's having violated
agency policy AE 02/03.01, based upon the record evidence as a whole, and that he correctly
applied relevant policies, rules and statutes.
In its internal personnel proceedings, the Department heavily relied upon the testimony
and report of AP&P Agent, Gwen Rowley. Ms. Rowley noted in her Presentence Investigation
Report that Grievant did not sign a release of information form which would have provided her
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with direct access to Dr. Eric Nielsen's psychological assessment of Mr. Hummel (Agency
Exht. 1, p. 16).

Agent Rowley testified that "one of the reasons" she recommended

incarceration in place of the plea agreement was that Mr. Hummel refused to sign the release
that would have allowed her to speak directly to Dr. Nielsen and to have obtained his
confidential analysis (T. II, 152). When Ms. Rowley first requested information from Dr.
Nielsen on Mr. Hummel, Dr. Nielsen told her very clearly that such would be "privileged
communication," (T. V, 12). Again, she called and wanted information from Dr. Nielsen
directly (T. V, 13). Dr. Nielsen again explained that he could not provide such information
based upon the provisions of the contract between Associated Behavior Consultants (ABC) and
the Department (ttI also made it very clear to her at that time that that would be a privileged
communication, because the nature of the contract clearly spells out the people that came in
under those circumstances had privileged communication. And that if subsequent information
was necessary for the presentence report, there would have to be a release of information before
that would happen" (T. V, 12)). Dr. Nielsen stated to her that he thought the release of
information "was not a good idea," (T. V, 13). Dr. Nielsen wrote the Department regarding
the apparent confusion and misunderstanding about Ms. Rowley's having access to Dr. Nielsen's
psychological evaluation of Grievant:
Later, I had similar conversations with her in which she [Gwen
Rowley] seemed confused and frustrated that Mr. Hummel hadn't
given her an open release such that I could talk with her. This
arrangement was at my suggestion because I believed that
Mr. Hummel should see the report and be aware of the
recommendations. Any difficulties arising out of that arrangement
were because of my insistence that it be managed in that fashion.
Mr. Hummel was simply following my advice. (Grvt. Exht. 2;
see also Grvt. Exhts. 1, 3-)
Mr. Hararael corroborated Dr. Nielsen's testimony as to his not signing the release form: a[Dr.
Nielsen] basically told me I was going to be asked to sign a release and, on an open-end basis,
not to sign it," (T. V, 148).
From the above-cited testimony and exhibits, the Step 5 Decision drew the following
inference:
As an apparent reprisal for Grievant's refusal to sign the release
for Ms. Rowley to discuss his case with Mr. Nielsen, Ms. Rowley
recommended that the plea agreement between the State and
Grievant be revoked, and that the Grievant be convicted and
sentenced to jail. (Finding number 61; see T. n, 152.)
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The CSRB hearing officer resolved the differing opinions between Agent Rowley and Dr.
Nielsen, concerning the release of Dr. Nielsen's report about Mr. Hummel's psychological
evaluation and family counseling sessions, in favor of Dr. Nielsen and Mr. Hummel, as
supported by the record (T. V, 12-13). The hearing officer found this testimony by Dr. Nielsen
persuasive.
Corroborating evidence is provided by Detective Collins, who had investigated the
Hummel family once in early December 1988, and again in July 1989. Detective Collins
testified that she felt that during July 1989, it would be sufficient for Mr. Hummel to get
counseling and needed help, but that Ms. Rowley influenced her to change her opinion:
Because of the several calls from Gwen. Mr. Hummers attitude had changed on
how he had come across to me. He had come across to me that he would get the
help that he needed and I felt that that would in fact happen. But she told me I'm
sure about a lot different problems. (T. HI. 23; also, see especially p. 25.)
Agent Rowley testified that because Mr. Hummel was a Corrections' Department
employee, that factor affected her preparation of the Presentence Report (T. n, 98-99). She
realized that "this would be what we call in our office a high profile case, one that would
possibly be reviewed by the chain of command," (T. n, 99). Ms. Rowley knew that her
superiors would want to review the case before it went to court (Ibid.). Rowley "was instructed
to keep in contact with her [a departmental Investigations Office investigator] as my investigation
continued." (Ibid.)
Thus, there is credible evidence from at least two witnesses (Dr. Nielsen and Detective
Collins) that the hearing officer's statement about "an apparent reprisal for Grievant's refusal
to sign the release for Ms. Rowley" had a factual basis.
II. ANDffl.
The Department argues that the Board's hearing officer's factual findings that Grievant
abused his daughter repeatedly are dispositive, and points to Findings numbers 22, 48 and 49.
Analogously, on a collateral issue, the Department avers that the hearing officer did not
correctly interpret Utah's statute concerning child abuse. As a matter of law this Board and its
hearing officers lack jurisdiction over establishing criminal violations. Furthermore, the Board
and its hearing officers do not have a duty or the authority to apply criminal statutory law to
determine any degree of alleged violations by State employees. Instead, the Board must rely
upon the conclusions of a court having proper jurisdiction.
IV.
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Prior to commencing the Step 5 proceedings, the Department moved to recuse the
appointed CSRB hearing officer. After considering and deliberating on the request, the Board
formally denied this motion on October 20, 1992. The Department argues that the appointed
hearing officer cannot render an impartial decision where the Department is a party. Including
this Hummel case, the appointed CSRB hearing officer has conducted and issued decisions in
three cases involving the Department. In his first case, Kim Harward v. Utah Department of
Corrections, 10 CSRB/H.O. 140, the ruling on Mr. Harward's promotion grievance was fully
denied, and the Department unconditionally prevailed. In the second case, Tim Parker v. Utah
Department of Corrections, 10 CSRB/H.O. 147, a portion of the Department's penalties was
sustained (regarding weapons' violations), with a larger portion of penalties being vacated. That
Step 5 ruling and determination was affirmed by the Board in Tim Parker v. Utah Department
of Corrections, 5 CSRB 47, the Step 6 Decision. The Hummel case is only the third case
adjudicated by the appointed hearing officer concerning this Department's cases. The record of
these cases does not support an allegation of bias.
With respect to the specific case at hand, the Department states that there is no evidence
to support the Step 5 Decision's procedural background comment that, "Grievant was assigned
to an outlying and abandoned tower where he was alone except for the company of the rats . .
. " (Agency Brief, p. 21). The evidence shows that the witness actually stated that he had been
placed "in tower five, a condemned tower at the time," (T. V, 105), that tower five was an
outlying tower because uit was on the southeast end of the perimeter," (T. V. 106). While "the
company of rats" was not mentioned, the witness stated specific references to deplorable safety
and sanitary conditions, which, along with much bird excreta, were voiced in the record:
. . . I believe they have their own safety personnel, but they had
deemed the tower to be unsafe and the wind would come up and
the tower would rock, the water ran inside and it was obvious, by
the time that I got up there, that it hadn't been occupied for quite
a while. There was literally inches of bird droppings in the tower.
The heater didn't work, but during my year's stay at tower five I
corrected all that myself. We got the heater to work and I cleaned
up the tower so it was at least tolerable to be in. (T. V. 105-06.)
(Emphasis supplied.)
The Department asserts that further evidence of the hearing officer's bias is shown in
evidentiary Finding number 5, which the Step 6 Brief quotes the latter part of, as follows:
. . . [Mrs. Hummel] was overly permissive, although on occasion
Mrs. Hummel resorted to corporal punishment, including the use
of weapons like a belt, when she could take no more of the
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misconduct or verbal abuse from her children.
The Board does not concur that this finding demonstrates a bias. It is important to understand
that the prior omitted portion of Finding number 5, above, discussed the "mismatch" between
the Hummel parents, the father using more a "corporal punishment regime" while the mother
"was overly permissive," although on very rare occasions she "resorted to corporal
punishment," including the use of something "like a belt." Dr. Nielsen, after counseling with
the entire Hummel family, concluded that Mrs. Hummel would "abdicate" family discipline to
Mr. Hummel (T. V, 29), and while she was "overly solicitous," he was "overly strict and harsh
with the kids," (T. V, 19). Dr. Nielsen observed that it was not just a matter that one parent
dominant and the other passive, but "it was a family dynamic that was happening," (T. V, 27,
29). The entire family was dysfunctional, not just the father, stated Dr. Nielsen several times
(T. V, 17, 19-20, 27, 29, 32).
The Department further asserts that the Step 5 Decision's Finding number 22 is
inaccurate, thus biased, wherein it states:

" . . . and following a heated argument which

probably involved physical assault by Sabrina."

While Sabrina appears to have verbally

assaulted her mother on the evening of July 10, 1989, in the "fucking bitch" confrontation in
the Hummel kitchen, the record does not support Sabrina physically assaulting her father earlier
that day over Mrs. Hummel's complaint of too many telephone calls to Mrs. Hummel.
However, we believe the Step 5 Decision's flaw to be a de minimis factual error, not a result
of bias. This hearing involved seven days spread over eight months (August-April). Minor
misstatements constituting harmless error are neither critical nor necessarily proof of bias.
The Department further argues that the Hearing Officer's bias is shown when its Step 6
Brief states at page 25, "The hearing officer is not competent to find, absent expert testimony,
that the bruises [of Sabrina] were minor or not serious."

The just-quoted comment is

presumably made in reference to Finding number 31, which states:
Betty Foster, Sabrina's maternal Grandmother, testified that the
bruises were fading when she saw them on July 19 [sic, July 15
anent Sabrina's bath] 1989. Photographs on [July 14] of Sabrina
show very little remaining bruising. In fact, the bruises are
difficult to see in the pictures at all. This indicates that what
bruising there was must have been caused on an earlier date, and
were not very serious.
The best evidence in support of the foregoing finding is Detective Collins' testimony; she
was present at the photographing on that date and later interpreted the photos during these
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proceedings.

Moreover, Detective Collins had retained the photos of Sabrina during her

investigation, and she had them before her when she testified at the hearing (T. HI, 17).
Detective Collins never stated that Sabrina's bruises were either major or serious (T. EI, 15-16).
She stated three times that Sabrina's bruises were "very, very light," and once each that they
were "very light bruising," and "were older bruises, just about healed." (Ibid.) Also, Detective
Collins clarified that "the small red marking" on Sabrina's face was caused by Sabrina's cat
(T. Ill, 16). The hearing officer saw the photos and heard the credible expert witness describe
Sabrina's bruises on July 19, 1989, as Detective Collins saw them firsthand. The Step 5
Decision's Finding number 31 is supported by the record evidence.
The Department objects to that portion of Finding number 70 that states: ". . . falsely
accused and publicly humiliated as a child abuser by the judge." Overall, Finding number 70
is one long sentence of nearly six full lines. To pull the above-quoted portion out of the full
context distorts the meaning of the full sentence. Our plain reading of the above-quoted phrase
shows that the Hearing Officer was making two separate points. One was that Mr. Hummel
perceived that he was "being falsely accused" when the court offered a reason for Grievant's
first marriage dissolving but for reasons different from those held by Mr. Hummel.
Additionally, the judge opined that Mr. Hummel had "made Sabrina the surrogate mother of that
family," which Mr. Hummel attempted to deny. When Mr. Hummel acknowledged that his use
of corporal punishment was to spank his children, the court attributed a far more physically
abusive manner to him: "That could be anything from a severe beating to just knock[ing] them
across the room once, is the way I took it," (Agency Exht. 21, p. 13). Continuing, the court
labeled Mr. Hummel "a bully": "You come across to me as a bully everywhere you go."
(Ibid.) Another label rejected by Mr. Hummel was when the court noted that he was a "police
officer," but had "all the makings of being abusive and cruel," meaning that Grievant was not
a competent officer (Agency Exht. 21, pp. 13-16). It was these kinds of labels being applied
to Mr. Hummel that Finding 70 determined as his "being falsely accused." The second point,
that of Grievant's being "publicly humiliated as a child abuser by the Judge," is based upon the
entirety of the October 10, 1989 court proceeding's transcript, which ultimately resulted in
Grievant's plea having been unconstitutionally taken by the court.
This tribunal holds that the Department's claims and arguments that attempt to portray
the Hearing Officer as biased against the Department are without merit.
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The Department urges that the evidentiary trier of fact relied upon inapposite evidence
in his determination of the Hummel case. Essentially, this point concerns the application of
Grievant's Exhibit 13 to this case. Grievant's Exhibit 13 is a compilation of 35 cases in which
the Department either meted out disciplinary penalties to departmental employees or otherwise
disposed of allegations of policy violations. During the evidentiary proceedings, the parties
disputed the relevance of certain departmental cases being applied to Mr. Hummel's facts and
circumstances.
The evidentiary examiner factually found and legally concluded that there was no policy
violation of AE 02/03.01 O, Standard of Conduct, on the matter of bringing discredit to the
Department while in court on October 10,1989. Subsequently, this Board has found and legally
concluded that Mr. Hummel did not violate policy AE 02/03.37 A(5), Unlawful Conduct,
because his guilty plea and conviction have been overturned, vacated and later sealed and
expunged. Therefore, only policy violation AE 02/02.02 C, Member Responsibility, remains.
We have found and legally conclude that while Mr. Hummel did not fiilly comply with the
policy's precise wording, he knew that the Department's Deputy Director—who was properly
a "superior officer" as required—had been informed of his child abuse charge by authorities,
and his wife reported directly, in person to his immediate supervisor, Will Fowlke, on the day
he was unexpectedly incarcerated. Grievant did not file a written report as the policy language
intends. Hence, Grievant is found partially culpable of this policy violation, at least to some
degree. Given the circumstance of only one policy violation by Grievant, the parties' prior
dispute over the relevance of the disciplinary cases contained in Grievant's Exhibit 13 is now
mooted. Mr. Hummel's single policy violation of AE 02/02.02 C, and the fact setting that it
was not an entirely flagrant violation on his part, does not warrant his dismissal from State
employment based upon this single incident.
VL
In point VI, the Department avers that the Hearing Officer's remedy should be amended
if the Board were to uphold the Step 5 Decision. The Step 5 remedy is not equitable, offers the
Department.

As there are some components of the Step 5 Decision's remedy that do not

comport with the Board's past remedial practices on reinstating unjustly dismissed employees,
this tribunal has amended the Step 5 Decision's order of reinstatement and remedies, as sought
by the Department. The Board's reinstatement remedies are set forth below in our "Decision."

vn.
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The Department terminated Grievant for allegedly violating three internal personnel
policies: a claim of unlawful conduct for a child abuse guilty plea, a claim of failing to report
his involvement with the criminal justice system, and a claim of bringing discredit upon the
Department. In so doing, the Department asserts that it did not abuse its discretion. The
evidence adduced at the Step 5 evidentiary proceeding—and discussed in detail above—shows
otherwise, however.
WITNESSES' INCONSISTENCIES AND CREDmiUTY
The evidentiary Step 5 proceedings produced numerous inconsistent statements by many
of the witnesses. The witnesses' various inconsistencies created serious credibility problems for
the trier of fact. The CSRB evidentiary examiner had to assess each witness's testimony as to
its credibility. As some witnesses were found more credible than others, this sifting, weighing
and analyzing of the evidence determined the Step 5 proceedings' ultimate decision.
THE BOARD'S APPELLATE CONCLUSIONS
1. The Department improperly suspended Grievant without pay from October 10, 1989,
through February 21, 1990, at which time he was reinstated to duty and received back pay. (T.
V, 105; Step 5 Procedural Finding number 4.)

State administrative law under Utah

Administrative Code, R477-11-1 .(1), requires basic due process before a career service employee
may be disciplined. R477-11-1 .(2) does not permit State agencies to suspend employees without
pay for four consecutive months (or any period over 30 calendar days per occurrence) as was
Mr. Hummel.

State administrative law only permits an agency to suspend a permanent

employee up to 30 calendar days per occurrence (R477-ll-l.(4)(b) albeit with due process first
being applied. Mr. Hummel's four month suspension by the Department was not a lawful act.
See Utah Department of Corrections v. Sucker, 796 P.2d 721 (Utah App. 1990), at footnote 3.
2. §67-19a-406(2)(c) establishes the CSRB's evidentiary standard in Step 5 proceedings
as the substantial evidence standard. Utah Administrative Code (Supp. 1993), R137-1-4, defines
"substantial evidence" for CSRB adjudicatory proceedings as meaning "something more than
a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance. It is relevant evidence such as a reasonable
person of an unprejudiced and thinking mind would accept to support the conclusion drawn from
it."
3. §63-46b-l(2)(e) of the UAPA excludes departmental "internal personnel actions within
an agency concerning its own employees, or judicial review of those actions" from both the
formal and informal adjudicatory provisions of the UAPA. The Department's pretermination3
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hearing is not a proceeding accorded any deference under either the UAPA or the Utah
Administrative Code (Supp. 1993), R137-1-20 C.
A. Utah Administrative Code (Supp. 1993), R137-1-20 C , provides that a CSRB Step 5
evidentiary hearing "shall be a new hearing for the record, held de novo, with both parties being
granted full administrative due process."
5. Utah Administrative Code (Supp. 1993), R137-1-20 C. 1., pertinently states: "The
CSRB hearing officer shall first make factualfindingsbased solely on the evidence at the hearing
without deference to any prior factual findings of the agency." The CSRB hearing officer then
determines whether: tt(a) the factual findings made from the evidentiary/step 5 hearing support
with substantial evidence the allegations made by the agency . . . and, (b) the agency has
correctly applied relevant policies, rules, and statutes."

These determinations are made

independently of an agency's prior findings and are based upon the evidence adduced at the
Step 5 proceedings. As a matter of law, the Department's termination decision regarding
Mr. Hummel's employment is entitled to no factual deference by the CSRB hearing officer at
the Step 5 proceedings.
6. The CSRB hearing officer/presiding officer, under §63-46b-2(l)(h), first determines
whether the Step 5 proceedings' factual findings support the agency's prior findings. If the
CSRB evidentiary examiner's factual findings differ from the agency's, then a different result
may be warranted. If, however, the CSRB evidentiary examiner's factual findings support the
agency's prior allegations, then the evidentiary examiner must determine whether the agency's
"disciplinary sanctions imposed" are "excessive, disproportionate or otherwise constitute an
abuse of discretion," {Utah Administrative Code (Supp. 1993), R137-1-20 C. 2). In this review,
the CSRB examiner must give deference to an agency's decision "unless the agency's penalty
is determined to be excessive, disproportionate or constitutes an abuse of discretion in which
case the CSRB hearing officer shall determine the appropriate remedy." (Emphasis supplied.)
7. The Department has not established the presence of reversible error with any specific
Step 5 factual findings.
8. The Department has not met its burden of marshalling all the evidence from the
record supporting the evidentiary factual findings to show that despite the supporting facts, and
in view of the supposed conflicting evidence, the evidentiary factual findings are not supported
by substantial evidence in the record showing that the Step 5 Decision is fatally flawed or that
reversible error is present. See, Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, 116 P.d 63, 68 (Utah App.
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1989); Department ofAir Force v. Snider, 824 P.d 448 (Utah App. 1991); and Zissi v. State Tax
Commission of Utah, 842 P.d 848, 852 (Utah 1992).
9. Thus, as a matter of law, the Department has failed to meet its burden of proof at the
Step 6 or Board-level review that reversible error is present.
10. The Board, as a matter of law, concludes that the Step 5 hearing officer/presiding
officer's factual findings are both reasonable and rational as based upon the evidentiary/step 5
record as a whole as required by Utah Administrative Code (Supp. 1993), R137-1-21 D. 1.
More specifically, the hearing officer determined that Mr. Hummel's dismissal by the
Department was not based upon the "just cause" standard because two of the agency's
allegations are unsupported by the evidence (AE 02/03.37 A(5) and AE 02/03.01), and the sole
remaining charge was substantially less serious and was mitigated by factors not previously
considered or not given proper weight by the Department (AE 02/02.02 C).
11. Having granted no deference to the Step 5 Decision under the correctness standard,
the Board now further concludes as a matter of law that the CSRB hearing officer has correctly
applied the relevant policies, administrative rules, and statutes as required by Utah
Administrative Code (Supp. 1993), R137-1-21 D. 2.
12. Utah Administrative Code (Supp. 1993), R137-1-20 J., authorizes the CSRB trier
of facts to modify disciplinary penalties that are found to be too severe, excessive or abusive:
If the hearing officer finds that the action complained of which was
taken by the appointing authority was too severe, even though for
good cause, the hearing officer may provide for such other remedy
or relief as deemed appropriate and in the best interest of the
respective parties. (Emphasis supplied.)
13. Utah Administrative Code (Supp. 1993), R137-1-201., states: "In those proceedings
where a disciplinary penalty is at issue, the past employment record of the employee is relevant
for purposes of either mitigating or sustaining the penalty in the event that the employee is found
guilty of the disciplinary charge alleged. *
14. This tribunal concludes as a matter of law that when agencies impose disciplinary
penalties they have a burden to show that a due process requirement has been met by not
imposing an excessive, disproportionate or abusive penalty. Due process governs and requires
a direct relationship between the disciplined employee's offense(s) and the agency's imposed
penalty(ies). This burden requires the agency to show that the offense is reasonably and
proportionately related to the penalty, pursuant to Utah Administrative Code (Supp. 1993), R1371-20 C. 2.
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15.

Once an agency meets its burden described in paragraph 13, above, then the

disciplined employee may show by evidence that the penalty was inconsistent with other prior
penalties imposed on similarly situated employees under the same or substantially similar
circumstances. It is not the agency's burden to affirmatively show consistency of disciplinary
treatment of affected employees absent evidence offered by the employee that the discipline was
inconsistently imposed compared with other similarly situated employees.
16. We find and legally conclude that the Department failed to show that the complained
of offense under AE 02/02.02 C, Member Responsibility, was reasonably related to the penalty
of dismissal.
17. Grievant met his burden of producing substantial evidence that the penalty imposed
on him was excessive, disproportionate and abusive through the introduction of Grvt. Exht. 13,
a summary of 35 Department disciplinary cases along with a compilation of those 35 individual
disciplinary cases. Case number 5 concerns a probationary, non-career service employee who
was found by the Department's ALJ to have violated §41-6-44 (blood alcohol content of 11%),
failed to inform his superior about the circumstances of his arrest, pled guilty in court to an
alcohol related reckless driving charge; wore his Correctional Officer's uniform in court and was
recognized as a Department employee; was found in violation of departmental policies AE
02/03.37 A(5) [cf. Hummel] and AE 02/03.01, the latter having to do with Mr. Hummel's
allegedly bringing discredit upon the Department. The departmental ALJ found grounds for
terminating the probationary employee while suggesting that career service status "might well
find that a lessor [sic] sanction could be imposed (e.g., suspension without pay)."

The

Department director did not terminate the employee in case number 5, but instead imposed a 1525 working days' suspension without pay, directed the employee to write a letter of apology, and
directed that a further evaluation be performed 14 days prior to expiration of the employee's
initial probationary term. A case on point with Mr. Hummel's is also that of a departmental
employee charged with illegally killing a bear, a violation of State law, and therefore a violation
of AE 02/03.37 A [comparable to Hummel] and AE 02/03.01 O [again, comparable to Hummel].
The Department's ALJ recommended termination or at least a 30 days' suspension with a pay
and grade reduction. The Department director imposed for both policy violations a 30 days'
suspension (including provision for substituting annual leave and compensatory time), a reduction
from Grade 23 to 21, a ten percent pay reduction, and no promotion or merit increases for one
year.

Both employees in cases 5 and 22 had greater violations with far less mitigating
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circumstances than did Mr. Hummel, but they had lesser penalties imposed than did
Mr. Hummel.
18.

As Mr. Hummel's disciplinary sanction was excessive, disproportionate and

constituted an abuse of discretion, he is ordered to be reinstated and made whole except for a
suspension of 30 calendar days.
19. The Board concludes as a matter of law that the Third District Court vacated
Mr. Hummel's guilty plea and overturned his Class B misdemeanor conviction, effective
January 2, 1992. Therefore, any attempt to attach a child abuse misdemeanor charge, be it
Class A, B or C, is moot. This tribunal has no jurisdiction to determine any level of criminal
offense. This Board is concerned only with the conduct (i.e., the alleged misconduct) of State
career service employees.

Had a judicial court adopted factual findings, we would have

considered those findings as final, and thus dispositive, and have adopted them, accordingly.
However, there are no judicial findings other than that Grievant's guilty plea and conviction have
been overturned, vacated, and his former arrest and conviction records fully expunged. District
Judge Richard Moffat's order is dispositive regarding the July 10,1989 child abuse complaint—it
does not exist. Consequently, we hold that Mr. Hummel committed no violation of departmental
policy AE 02/03.37 A(5), as alleged.
20. The Department's contention that the proper Step 5 evidentiary standard is "latitude
and deference" is moot. The CSRB legally adopted, and officially promulgated through the
State's rulemaking act at §63-46a et seq., the standards and provisions set forth at Utah
Administrative Code (Supp. 1993), R137-1-20 C , effective November 2, 1992. The latter
standards are applicable to these Step 5 and Step 6 proceedings.
DECISION
The evidence shows that Mr. Hummel did not violate departmental policies AE 02/03.37
A(5), Unlawful Conduct, or AE 02/03.01, Standard of Conduct. The only violation committed
by Grievant was AE 02/02.02 C, Member Responsibility. The latter violation by Mr. Hummel
was neither as flagrant nor was he as culpable as alleged by the Department. Mr. Hummel's
dismissal from his employment on May 28, 1991, has been found to be excessive,
disproportionate and an abuse of discretion; therefore, it is not supported by just cause. Just
cause requires that Grievant be reinstated as directed and ordered by this Board contingent to
the following conditions:
1. The Department is ordered to reinstate Mr. Hummel and to make him whole for his
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loss of salary and benefits except for a 30 calendar days' suspension for his failure to report in
writing to a superior officer.
2.

The Department is ordered to reinstate Mr. Hummel to his last-held position of

Enforcement and Security Officer at Grade 20. Previously, he held a Grade 21 position but the
State has restructured this class series. [This series has been changed from levels I, II and HI
at Grades 17, 19, and 21 to simply levels I and n at Grades 18 and 20, respectively.]
Mr. Hummel's salary, however, is to be calculated first at the rate he was previously earning
on May 28, 1991, and then his salary rate is to be increased so that he receives upon
reinstatement all pay increases that he would have earned had he continuously been employed
without an unjust interruption, after that date as based upon a presumption of at least satisfactory
annual performance ratings.
3. There is no award for interest, back pay, or attorney fees (§67-19-406(4)(a)).
4. The amount of back pay to be awarded Mr. Hummel by the Department shall be a
lump sum minus any unemployment insurance payments and any gross employment earnings
received between May 28, 1991, and the date of his reinstatement. Mr. Hummel is to receive
the compensation amount that he actually lost through his dismissal from the State, but he is not
to be enriched with additional or double earnings.

Any financial disputes regarding

Mr. Hummel's reinstatement of back pay should be based upon his State and Federal income
tax filings for the years 1991, 1992, 1993, and for any applicable years thereafter.
5. Mr. Hummel is to have all of his State provided employee benefits awarded to him
effective May 28, 1991, which are regularly paid by the Department as his employing agency.
His seniority and longevity shall continue from his original hire date of December 27, 1987, as
if he had been continuously employed, including all retirement credits. Effective with the
beginning of the first pay roll period of calendar year 1994, Mr. Hummel shall be credited with
320 hours (40 days) of accrued annual leave. Had Mr. Hummel been continuously employed
since his date of hire on December 27, 1987, he would have already begun qualifying for five
hours per pay period and should be so credited henceforth effective December 27, 1992.
Effective with his dismissal date of May 28, 1991, Grievant is to be credited with four hours
of accrued sick leave per payroll period up through his reinstatement and reporting for duty.
6. Beginning January 1, 1993, Mr. Hummel is to receive cash payment for those 11
State holidays for which he was not compensated for in his employment throughout 1993. Thus,
whatever number of holidays his employer provided would be subtracted from 11 and he is to
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be paid for the remaining unpaid holidays.
7. The Board will retain jurisdiction over any disputes by either party for 60 working
days effective upon the date of Mr. Hummel's return to active duty with the Department.
8. A copy of this Step 6 Decision and Order may be placed in Grievant's departmental
personnel file as a reminder to Mr. Hummel that his conduct outside the work place may directly
relate to his employment with the State.
9. In the event that this decision and order is appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals,
and in the further event that the court were to affirm the Board's decision, the foregoing
remedial provisions shall be applicable upon the court's published decision.

DECISION UNANIMOUS.
Bruce T. Jones, Chairman
Jean M. Bishop, Member
David M. Hilbig, Member
DATED this 5

J>

day of February 1994.

Bruce'T. JorvesTChairman
Career ServiceTfteview Board
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ENDNOTES
1. Neila Hummel's sister Tori McDonald was referred to by several surnames in the record (e. g., Smith, Chicon,
McDonald, etc.). While not yet married to Drew McDonald during July 1989, she later married him in August 1990,
but after the police raid of May 25, 1990, when the newspaper reported her name as Victoria Chicon. As she testified
under the name of Tori McDonald in these proceedings, we apply that name to her. Tori McDonald's minor daughter,
however, testified under the name of Cherie Dowdle.
2. Grievant had previous peace officer service. He had served for six months as the police chief of Alpine City, but
resigned to care full time for his terminally ill father. Many years later, he served as a Park City police officer but
resigned to move from the Coalville/Rockport area to Salt Lake City to care for his seriously ill, bed-ridden mother.
3. Cleveland Bd. ofEduc. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985).

RECONSIDERATION
A party may apply for reconsideration of a Step 6 decision through R137-1-21 J and Utah Code Unamotated
§63-46b-13.

JUDICIAL REVIEW
A party may petition for judicial review of afinalagency action pursuant to Utah Code Unannotated §63-46b-14
and -16.
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BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH
-ooOoo-

In The Matter Of:
CORRECTIONS TO
DECISION AND FINAL
AGENCY ACTION

MICHAEL DEAN HUMMEL,
Grievant,
v.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,

Case Nos. 5 CSRB 50 (Step 6)
11 CSRB/H.O. 151

Agency.
-00O00--

ERRATA SHEET
The following corrections have been made to the original decision issued on February
23, 1994:
On page 32, paragraph 3, delete "back pay" and insert "damages".
DATED this 28th day of February 1994.

k

Robert N. White
Administrator

">i iJL JL{

1120 State Office Building • Capitol Hill • Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 • 538-3048 0 J 2 5

ADDENDUM F

JUNO J fg92 'JJ

BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH
In The Matter Of:
MICHAEL DEAN HUMMEL,
Grievant,
v.

ORDER REMOVING
INDEFINITE STAY
OF PROCEEDINGS

UTAH DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,
Agency.

Grievant' s counsel has requested that the Career Service Review Board • s (CSRB)
Indefinite Stay on the above pending matter be lifted. Grievant • s request was received on
June 3,1992. Therefore, it is ORDERED that this matter be placed on the CSRB • s docket
of Step 5 proceedings for adjudication unless otherwise resolved.
DATED this 3rd day of June 1992.

Chairman
Career Service RevTev

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that a true and exact copy of the foregoing ORDER REMOVING
INDEFINITE STAY OF PROCEEDINGS has been sent via the U.S. Postal Service or
State Mailing to the following:
Michael Dean Hummel
1131 East 4270 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
Kathryn Collard
COLLARD & RUSSELL
415 Judge Building
8 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
O. Lane McCotter
Executive Director
Department of Corrections
STATE MAIL

•Carrie Sandbaken Hill
Program Director
Legal Services
Department of Corrections
STATE MAIL
Kirk M. Torgensen
Assistant Attorney General
Department of Corrections
STATE MAIL
Stephen G. Schwendiman
Attorney General' s Office
11th Floor
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

DATED this 4th day of June 1992.

Claudia L. Jones
Secretary
Career Service Review Board

ADDENDUM G

Carrie Hill #5342
General Counsel
Ralph Adams #5433
Staff Counsel
6100 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone (801) 265-5560

BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH
In The Matter Of:
MICHAEL DEAN HUMMEL,
MOTION FOR ORDER
REMANDING ACTION FOR
AGENCY DETERMINATION

Grievant,
v.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
Agency.

COMES NOW the Agency, by and through its counsel, Ralph Adams,
and hereby moves the Career Service Review Board for an Order
remanding

the

instant

action

to

the

Agency

level

for

a

determination of the appropriate discipline to be imposed on
Grievant. This Motion is based on the reasons and arguments as more
fully stated in the Memorandum in Support of Motion for Order
Remanding Action for Agency Determination.
Dated this

//

day of J«*^c

1992.

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

Ralplr Adams
Staff Counsel

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the attached
MOTION FOR ORDER REMANDING ACTION FOR AGENCY DETERMINATION was
mailed first class, .postage prepaid to the following individuals
this l(p
day of dotU
1992.
Kathryn Collard
Collard and Russel
415 Judge Building
8 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Carrie Hill #5342
General Counsel
Ralph Adams #5433
Staff Counsel
6100 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone (801) 265-5560

BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH
In The Matter Of:
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR ORDER
REMANDING ACTION FOR
AGENCY DETERMINATION

MICHAEL DEAN HUMMEL,
Grievant,
v.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
Agency.

COMES NOW the Agency, by and through its counsel, Ralph Adams,
and

submits

this Memorandum

in Support

of Motion

for Order

Remanding Action for Agency Determination.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

On July 28, 1989, Grievant was charged in the Salt Lake

County Circuit Court with the offense of child abuse, a class B
misdemeanor.
2,

On August 14, 1989, Grievant pleaded guilty to the

criminal charge. Judge Griffiths accepted the plea and on October
10, 1989, Grievant was sentenced to serve 360 days in jail, to pay
a fine of $500.00, suspended 330 days in jail, and $200.00, and

committed Grievant to jail forthwith.
3.

On November 20, 1989, Grievant was served with Agency's

Administrative

Complaint which began the instant disciplinary

process.
4.

The parties appeared before the Administrative Law Judge

on April 25, 1990, for an evidentiary hearing.
5.

On June 22, 1990, Grievant's counsel filed a Motion to

Stay the administrative proceedings. That stay was granted by the
Administrative Law Judge for Agency.
6.

Following

hearings before Judge Griffiths, Grievant

appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals. On November 14, 1990, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
7.

Grievant then petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for a

Writ of Certiorari. His petition was denied on March 5, 1991.
8.
Report

On May 10, 1991, the Administrative Law Judge issued his
and

Recommendation

based

on

the

evidentiary

hearing

previously held on April 25, 1990.
9.

Agency issued its Final Order terminating Grievant's

employment on May 28, 1991. The termination was based in large
measure on Grievant's conviction for child abuse pursuant to his
plea of guilty.
10.

Grievant

then appealed the dismissal to the Career

Service Review Board.
11.

On July 10, 1991, the CSRB granted Grievant's requested

indefinite stay on the proceedings while he pursued post conviction
remedies.
12.

On January 2, 1992, Judge Richard Moffat of the Third

Judicial District Court set aside Grievant's criminal conviction,
13.

Grievant has now requested, and has been granted, a lift

of the indefinite stay.

DISCUSSION

A DECISION BASED ON FACTS WHICH NO LONGER EXIST SHOULD BE REMANDED
TO THE DECIDING AGENCY FOR AN APPROPRIATE FACTUAL HEARING
The Administrative Law Judge for the Department of Corrections
stated in his Report and Recommendation that "The most important
matter in this case is the conviction for child abuse." The fact
that Grievant was convicted of child abuse, based on his plea of
guilty, was obviously the important factor in the recommendation of
the Administrative Law Judge for termination. The Final Order
signed by David Franchina, Deputy Director of the Department of
Corrections, also relies heavily on the fact that Grievant was
convicted

of

child

abuse. This

fact

no

longer

exists. The

Department of Corrections should be allowed to make a determination
of the appropriate sanction based on the facts as they presently
exist before the CSRB becomes involved in an appeal of a sanction
which may or may not be warranted.
The instant action is not unlike civil actions where remand is
required when the facts supporting a determination change. In Klatt
v. Thomas, 788 P.2d 510 (Utah 1990), the trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants based on the expiration
of the statute of repose. Before the Plaintiff's appeal was
decided, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, in an unrelated

case,

held

that

the

particular

statute

of

repose

was

unconstitutional. The Supreme Court in Klatt ordered a remand of
the case because the fact upon which the action was decided (the
statute of repose) had changed. This is the same fact scenario as
in the instant action. The fact upon which the action was decided
has changed. The case should be remanded for a determination of the
appropriate sanction based upon the facts as they presently exist.
To burden the CSRB with an appeal of the instant action is a
waste of limited time and energy. Axiomatic is the notion that an
appellate entity must have a valid decision from a lower tribunal
to review. This is not the case in the instant action based on the
alteration of the facts upon which the lower tribunal's decision
was rendered. The CSRB would waste its time and energy and that of
Grievant and Agency in reviewing a decision which may not be valid
based on the change of facts.
R137-1-21

(B)(2) states that

"An evidentiary hearing is

intended solely for the purpose of receiving evidence which either
refutes or substantiates specific claims or charges." Grievant's
specific claim is that termination is not appropriate now because
he now stands in a different position than when termination was
implemented. Obviously, the evidence received at the present time
will differ substantially from the evidence which was available to
Agency at the time it made the decision to terminate Grievant's
employment. Agency' decision was based on the facts as they existed
at the time. Agency can only act pursuant to the facts. Now that
the facts have changed, this matter should be remanded to Agency
for a determination based on presently admissible facts.

CONCLUSION

The decision

rendered

by Agency to terminate Grievant's

employment was based on facts which no longer exist. Case law in
civil actions supports remanding actions such as this under similar
fact scenarios. To hear a appeal of a decision which has possibly
been rendered moot is an unnecessary waste of time and energy. The
CSRB has the authority pursuant to R137-1-20 (3) to grant this
Motion for Remand. Agency, therefore, respectfully requests that
the CSRB remand the instant action for a determination of the
appropriate sanction based on the facts as they presently exist.

Dated this

lb
^o^i
/(* day of ~^^*L-

, 1992.

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

Ralph^Adams
Staff Counsel

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the attached
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ORDER REMANDING ACTION FOR
AGENCY DETERMINATION was mailed first classy postage prepaid to the
following individuals this lip
day of A>()f\C^
1992.
Kathryn Collard
Collard and Russel
415 Judge Building
8 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM H

KATHRYN COLLARD, #0697
STEVE RUSSELL, #0238
COLLARD & RUSSELL
Attorneys for Grievant
415 Judge B u i l d i n g
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah
84111
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 534-1664
BEFORE

In t h e M a t t e r
MICHAEL

THE
OP

CAREER SERVICE REVIEW
THE STATE OF UTAH

BOARD

Of:
DEAN

HUMMEL,

Grievant,
v.

GRIEVANT f S OBJECTION
TO MOTION FOR ORDER
REMANDING ACTION FOR
AGENCY
DETERMINATION

DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
Agency.

Grievant Michael Dean Hummel, by and through his undersigned
counsel, hereby objects to the Department of Corrections1 Motion
For Order Remanding Action For Agency Determination, dated June
16, 1992.
In support of this objection, Grievant respectfully shows to
the Board of Review that:
1. Since the Department

of Corrections

has previously

terminated the Grievant's employment, it has no jurisdiction or
authority to make any determination with regard to the Grievant.
Therefore, it would be improper for the Career Service Review
Board to remand this action to the Department of Corrections as a
matter of law.

2.
Klatt

In support of its motion for remand, the Department cites

v.

Thomas,

788 P.2d 510 (Utah 1990). In Klatt,

the Utah

Supreme Court remanded a case back to the trial court when a fact
critical to the appeal changed during the pendency of the appeal.
See, Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Order Remanding Action
For Agency Determination, at 3-4. However, the trial court in
Klatt

retained jurisdiction and authority over the parties to

redetermine the matter in question whereas in this case the
Department

no longer has jurisdiction or authority over the

Grievant. Thus, Klatt

is immediately distinguishable from this

case and provides no authority for the remand of this case to the
Department.
3.

Since January 2, 1992, when Judge Richard Moffat of the

Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
granted defendant Hummel's Writ Of Habeas Corpus and set aside the
conviction on which Grievant's employment was terminated by the
Department, Grievant's undersigned counsel has made every effort
to work with the Department of Corrections to resolve Grievant's
claims against the Department to no avail.
4.

In April, 1992, Grievant's counsel directed a written

proposal of settlement to the Agency to which Grievant's counsel
has not even received the courtesy of a response.
5.
that

his

In May, 1992, Grievant informed his undersigned counsel
POST

certification

was

due

to

lapse.

Grievant's

undersigned counsel requested the Department of Corrections to
sponsor Grievant to receive the 40 hours of training that Grievant
required to maintain his certification. Grievant's undersigned

2

counsel proposed this accomodation to the Department as a means of
mitigating damages for both the Grievant and the Department in
this matter. Again, the Department refused to participate in this
reasonable means of maintaining the status quo during the pendency
of this action.
6.

In the

Memorandum

in

support

of their

Motion,

the

Department asserts that this matter should be remanded because the
fact of Mr. Hummel's conviction no longer exists. See,
In

Support

Of

Motion

Determination, at 3.

For

Order

Remanding

Action

Memorandum
For

Agency

However, the Department has been aware of

this "change in the facts" for six months since the Writ of Habeas
Corpus setting aside the illegal conviction of Grievant Hummel was
granted and has refused to take any good faith actions to resolve
Grievantfs claims against the Department of Corrections.
7.

In view of the foregoing,

Grievant

submits that the

Department's belated attempt to prevent the hearing and resolution
of this matter by seeking a remand on the eve of the Pre-Hearing
Conference

is simply

an attempt

by the Department

to

inflict

further delay and damages on the Grievant, and to get this case
back under the ageis of the Department so that the Department can
attempt to find other means of attempting to justify its unlawful
actions against the Grievant.
BASED upon the foregoing, Grievant respectfully requests that
the Board of Review deny the Department of Corrections' motion for
remand of this action and schedule this matter for hearing.

3

DATED this 23rd day of June, 1992.
COLLARD & RUSSELL

By:
ievant

CERTIFICATE OF BAND DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 24th day of June, 1991, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Grievant's Objection To Motion
For Order Remanding Action For Agency Determination, was hand
delivered to Mr. Robert White, Career Service Review Board, 1120
State Office Building, Capitol Hill, Salt Lake City, Utah

84114

and to Mr. Ralph Adams, Assistant Attorney General, Department of
Corrections, 6100 South 300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah

4

84107.

ADDENDUM I
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BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OFUTAH
In The Matter Of:
MICHAEL DEAN HUMMEL,
Grievant,

ORDER DENYING MOTION
FOR REMAND

v.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
Agency.

Case No. 11 CSRB/H. O. 151

The Utah Department of Corrections' Motion For Order Remanding Action For
Agency Determination, dated June 16, 1992, is denied.
The above-captioned case has been assigned to the appointed Career Service Review
Board Hearing Officer (and Presiding Officer), A. Robert Thorup.
DATED this 26th day of June 1992.

^M>7cik

Robert N. White
Administrator
Career Service Review Board

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that a true and exact copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTION
FOR REMAND has been sent via the U.S. Postal Service or State Mailing to the following:
Michael Dean Hummel
1131 East 4270 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
Kathryn Collard
COLLARD & RUSSELL
415 Judge Building
8 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
O. Lane McCotter
Executive Director
Department of Corrections
STATE MAIL

Carrie Sandbaken Hill
Program Director
Legal Services
Department of Corrections
STATE MAIL
•^alph Adams
Assistant Attorney General
Office of General Counsel
Department of Corrections
STATE MAIL
A. Robert Thorup, Esq.
CSRB Hearing Officer

DATED this 26th day of June 1992.

&*«*&jr^

Claudia L. Jones
Secretary
Career Service Review Board

ADDENDUM J

SUMMARY OF AGENCY DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS AND DISPOSITIONS
1992

Flinders, R

collected pay for falsified time sheets
at 2nd job

30 days suspend w/o pay
demoted grade 25 to 21

1990

Schirle, C

unlawful conduct, use of alcohol, abuse
of position

20 days suspend w/o pay,
letter of repremand,
fitness for duty
evaluation, counseling,
corrective action plan

3

1988

Zobell, C

kissed two women employees on the job
sexual harassment

5 days suspend w/o pay
take classes on sexual
harassment & supervisor

4

1986

Schiffman, K

theft

recommend resignation
no option for rehire

5

1987 Meyer, C

verbal conflict with other law officer
bringing discredit to Department
already on probationary status

probation, letter of
apology, evaluation,
15 to 25 suspend w/o pay

6

1987 Williams, L Dan

falsification of reports, untruthfulness

4 days suspend w/o pay

7

1987

Nippert, D H

violation of health regulation & instruction
argued with supervisor
retrieved improperly thawed meat from dumpster
derleiction of duty, discredit Dept

termination

1988

Peterson, D

off duty shooting accident, found accidental
2nd job not reported

letter of reprimand, up
to 3 days without pay

1988

Peterson, C

unauthorized use of state vehicle
refuse to answer and lied to Dept Investigator

20 day suspend w/o pay
teach Dept course
place final order and
action plan in file

10

1987

Thompson, O

misuse of state eguiptment

demoted

11

1988

Davis, K

transfer tropical fish from facility

letter of reprimand

2
12

1988

Johnstun, 6

picked up by vice squad

30 days suspend w/o pay

13

1988

Norquist

interferred with paramedics * sheriffs
misuse of alcohol

15 days suspend w/o pay
evaluate for counseling

14

1988 Welling, H

allegations of sexual harassment

20 days suspend w/o pay
demoted 2 grades

15

1989

Birk, D

violate Std of Conduct AE 02/02.01 AftR
and AE 02/03.05
dereliction of duties AE 02/02.35A
endangering conduct by prison staff

5 days suspend w/o pay
corrective action plan
submit to fitness for
duty testing

16

1989

DeSpain, J

DUI class A misdemeanor
(led to car accident)
assault

termination

17

1989

Stickley, D

hired male stripper for staff farewell party

2 days suspend w/o pay

18

1989

Vincent, D

"flipped off" citizen while in Dept car

letter of reprimand
2 days suspend w/o pay

19

1989

Webb, D

DUI (2nd offense)
(states on pg 2 Discussion that DUI 1st
offense generally 10 to 15 days w/o pay)

20 days suspend w/o pay
receive professional
evaluation, comply with
recommendations for
counseling or treatment,
have no future alcohol
infractions

29

1990 Dysart, T

"theft by extortion" 3rd degree felony
"unlawful conduct" AE 02/03.37
discredited to Dept of Corrections

recommend termination

21

1990

offered money to undercover vice officer

30 days suspend w/o pay
in two 2 week blocks
receive couseling and
compley with
recommendations, allow
Dept to monitor
counseling

Hinesley, T

3
22

1990

23

Hobbs, A

violated the law, discredited Department
allegations of illegally killing a bear

30 days suspen w/o pay
reduced grade 23 to 21
salary reduced 10%
1 year ineligible for
merit increases or
promotion
2 yrs ineligibility to
compete for supervisor;
1 yr w/o case load or
supervise offenders;
not be assigned to
position requiring peace
officer for 1 yr;
no hunting for 1 yr;
fitness for duty test;
any violation leads to
termination

1990 Madson, C

DOT involving 1 car accident
(class B misdemeanor)

15 days suspend w/o pay
require alcohol
dependants evaluation

24

1990

Robinson, L

DOT

30 days suspend w/o pay
complete alcohol
treatment program;
reduction in rank from
Capt to Lt

25

1991

Bona, T

DUI

26

1991

Hale, C

reported to work under the influence (alcohol)
insubordination, falsification of reports

termination

27

1991

Mackay, J

cheating on exam at the Academy

termination

28

1991

Niemann, T

intentionally adulterated baggies of cocaine
conduct constitutes a 3rd degree felony

termination

(2nd time in 5 yrs)

alcohol related reckless driving

20 days suspend w/o pay
letter of reprimand
complete alcohol
treatment program

4
29

1992

Eckman, R

unlawful possession of protected wildlife

letter of reprimand
placed in file until
next evaluation, if
successful, letter
removed from file

30

1992

Renckert, M

impersonation of a police officer
discredited Dept.

5 days suspend w/o pay

31

1992

Miller, M

dereliction of duty, witholding criminal
termination
information, use or possession of drugs,
prohibited offender relationships, interaction
with offenders, disloyal remarks said publically

32

1992

Coulter, M

mJkm&im*mf**-*»*I>HM

if •»•»•*!**—»•»

no discipline imposed

complaint filed regarding physically abusing
stepchild
33

1992 Manwill, J

DUI (4th conviction) felony offense
subject to dismissal pending successful
2 yrs of unsupervised probation

34

1992

Thoaas, J

used Dept letterhead to procure weapon for
termination
civilian and transferred excess munitions from
training exercise to same civilian to pay a debt;
procured manufactor of imitation controlled
substance; then used authority to arrange sale

35

1912

Burch, W

arrested for theft;
did not report to supervisor

30 days suspen w/o pay;
demoted grade 25 to 22;
relieved of supervisory
roles for 1 yr;
barred from operating
state vehicle;
corrective action plan

all details of actions
in personnel file to be
released to prospective
employers
shall not be eligible
for rehire with Dept of
Corrections

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the
day of July, 1994, I caused to
be mailed, postage prepaid, two true and accurate copies of the
foregoing ADDENDA TO BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the following:
Kathryn Collard
Attorney for Grievant
8 East Broadway #415
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Robert N. White, Administrator
Career Service Review Board
1120 State Office Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

